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A TALE OF TWO DECADES: WAR REFUGEES 
AND ASYLUM POLICY IN THE  
EUROPEAN UNION  
MARYELLEN FULLERTON

 
―Death to Collaborators!‖ When he found this note on the front door of 
his Baghdad home in late 2006, Meki Elgafaji did not waste any time. An 
employee of a British firm that provided security for travel between the 
Baghdad airport and the ―green zone,‖1 he and his wife fled Iraq. His was 
a ―mixed marriage,‖ his wife a Sunni Muslim. His uncle, an employee for 
the same firm, had been killed.
2
 Three years after the war in Iraq began, 
the future seemed to be closing in on the Elgafaji family. 
After escaping, Mr. and Mrs. Elgafaji made their way to the 
Netherlands, where they applied for a temporary residence permit based 
on the danger they faced from indiscriminate violence in Iraq. The Dutch 
authorities rejected their application, and a series of appeals brought the 
Elgafaji case to the Dutch Council of State, which stayed the proceedings 
while it sought an interpretation of the new European Union (EU) law on 
asylum from the European Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(ECJ). For more than a year the ECJ considered the case. On February 17, 
2009, the court issued its first decision concerning the right of war 
refugees to obtain asylum in the EU. The ECJ ruled, as the Elgafajis had 
argued, that proof of indiscriminate violence can warrant asylum under EU 
law.  
Using the Elgafaji opinion as a vantage point, this Article provides 
refugee law scholars and advocates in the United States with a window 
into the profound changes in asylum policy in Europe during the past two 
decades. These years have seen the European Union evolve from a 
collection of nations that jealously guarded sovereign prerogatives over 
migration to a supranational institution that is devising a regional approach 
 
 
  Maryellen Fullerton, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Brooklyn Law School 
for its generous research support, my research assistant Rachel Lerner for her tireless efforts, and my 
colleague and friend Stacy Caplow for her valuable insight and suggestions. 
 1. The International Zone in central Baghdad, commonly referred to as the Green Zone, was the 
headquarters of the Coalition Provisional Authority starting in 2003. This ten square kilometer area 
was surrounded by high walls and entry was limited to checkpoints controlled by coalition forces. Iraqi 
government forces assumed full control of this area in January 2009. 
 2. The facts are taken from Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. 
I-00921, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/499aaee52.html, reprinted in 21 INT‘L J. 
REFUGEE L. 297 (2009). 
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to asylum, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Imagine the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico agreeing to implement a common 
procedure for all asylum seekers who arrive in North America!  
The significance of the CEAS has largely been overlooked in the 
debate over asylum and forced migration in the United States, even though 
it has been the subject of serious and sustained debate by scholars in the 
EU.
3
 This is testimony to the reality that, despite easy electronic access to 
scholarship written on any continent, refugee law—like politics—is local. 
International law, supplemented by transnational and supranational norms, 
supplies the source and content of the legal rights of refugees, but asylum 
seekers file their claims for protection in national legal systems. As a 
consequence, the experts who assist asylum seekers and advocates who 
attempt to win support for legislative change focus on the nuances of the 
national laws that affect their clients. 
This Article aims to broaden the policy debates in the United States to 
include a discussion of the CEAS. In crafting a common asylum law, EU 
policymakers have wrestled with numerous thorny issues familiar to 
policymakers, scholars, and advocates in the United States. Do individuals 
fleeing from widespread and indiscriminate violence in war zones have a 
right to asylum? Should there be deadlines for filing asylum applications? 
When, if ever, are expedited proceedings permissible? What is the 
significance of traveling through countries with functioning asylum 
systems prior to reaching the State in which the asylum application is 
filed? Frequently, the EU solutions to these and other legal questions 
differ from those adopted by the United States. In addition, the EU 
approach to resolving vigorous debates over highly charged asylum issues 
differs from that taken on this side of the Atlantic. There is much to learn 
from both the debates and the resulting legislative choices.  
 
 
 3. See, e.g., Michael John-Hopkins, The Emperor’s New Safe Country Concepts: A UK 
Perspective on Sacrificing Fairness on the Altar of Efficiency, 21 INT‘L J. REFUGEE L. 218 (2009); 
OLGA FERGUSON SIDORENKO, THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM: BACKGROUND, CURRENT 
STATE OF AFFAIRS, FUTURE DIRECTION (2007); Maria Panezi, The 2005 Asylum Procedures 
Directive: Developing the European Asylum Law, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 501 (2007); Jane McAdam, 
The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime, 17 
INT‘L J. REFUGEE L. 461 (2005); DIAS URBANO DE SOUSA & PHILIPPE DE BRUYCKER, THE 
EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN ASYLUM POLICY (2004); Ryszard Piotrowicz & Carina van Eck, 
Subsidiary Protection and Primary Rights, 53 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 107 (2004); Elspeth Guild, Seeking 
Asylum: Storm Clouds Between International Commitments and EU Legislative Measures, 29 EUR. L. 
REV. 198 (2004); D. BOUTEILLET-PAQUET, SUBSIDIARY PROTECTION OF REFUGEES IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: COMPLEMENTING THE GENEVA CONVENTION?, in COLLECTION DE LA FACULTE DE DENT DE 
L‘UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES (2002). 
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The ECJ judgment in Elgafaji highlights the major structural 
developments that have led to the new regional approach adopted in 
Europe. A substantial shift in power from the national governments to the 
central EU institutions was the predicate for a common asylum policy. I 
note the multilateral treaty negotiations that gave rise to the CEAS and the 
burst of legislative activity that followed. The arc of the new legislation 
covers many topics, from temporary legal status to complementary 
protection to procedural safeguards. Several of the laws recently 
promulgated in the EU have legislative analogs in the United States, and I 
will briefly note some salient comparisons.  
I then turn to the CEAS‘s guarantee of protection for victims of 
indiscriminate violence. The notion that states should supplement the 
protection they provide to those who flee persecution by providing similar 
safeguards to those who face serious harm if they return to armed conflict 
in their homelands, ―subsidiary protection‖ in EU parlance, is not a new 
one. Many states, European and others, have authorized non-citizens in 
refugee-like situations to remain until the danger is abated. But which 
ones, and how many? The CEAS creates an enforceable right of asylum 
for civilians at risk due to indiscriminate violence from armed conflict, 
while it cautions that risks experienced by the general population are 
usually insufficient to warrant this protection. The tensions in this 
prescription are obvious. The ECJ‘s Elgafaji judgment is the first judicial 
attempt to forge a coherent interpretation of this guarantee of the CEAS.  
I. BOOKENDS OF AN ERA: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE JUDGMENTS 
OF 1987 AND 2009  
To appreciate the institutional import of the ECJ‘s 2009 Elgafaji 
judgment, it is necessary to look back two decades to an earlier dispute 
concerning European migration law. In 1985, the European Commission 
(the Commission), the administrative arm of what was then called the 
European Economic Community (EEC),
4
 established a communication 
 
 
 4. The process of European integration began in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which first implemented a supranational structure for a ―community‖ of member 
states, which included France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The 1957 
Rome Treaty brought these six countries together in order to achieve economic integration through a 
common market. Simultaneously, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was 
created. The European Communities were institutionally structured with a Council and Commission 
for each respective community and a single Court of Justice and Assembly. In 1967, that structure was 
changed to a single council and single commission to represent all three communities. The 
Commission functioned as the executive organ of the communities, and the Council functioned as the 
primary decision-making body. Through further treaties over the decades, the primary institutional 
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and consultation procedure on migration policies.
5
 In essence, the 
Commission required Member States to inform the Commission and the 
other Member States of data about workers entering from non-Member 
States and of any draft measures or policies applicable to these 
individuals. The Commission or a Member State could initiate a 
consultation procedure to exchange information, identify common 
problems, and suggest common measures to harmonize national legislation 
concerning these workers.  
Five of the ten States that comprised the European Community filed 
suit against the Commission, arguing that it had exceeded the scope of its 
authority and intruded into matters reserved to the national authority of the 
Member States.
6
 The state parties conceded that article 117 of the EEC 
Treaty required Member States to improve working and living conditions 
for workers in order to establish and maintain a common market, and that 
article 118 authorized the Commission to promote cooperation between 
Member States to improve particular social conditions such as 
employment and working conditions.
7
 They argued, however, that these 
 
 
structure was retained, although the legal foundation for their existence has been amended and the 
communities renamed the EU. See P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 12–25 
(London Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed. 2007). 
 5. Commission Decision EC 85/38/EEC of 8 July 1985, Setting Up a Prior Communication and 
Consultation Procedure on Migration Policies, 1985 O.J. (L 217) 25.  
 6. Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom brought an action 
under article 173 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3 (as in effect 1985) [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (repealed by Consolidated Versions of the 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functions of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010 O.J. (C 
8311)), seeking a declaration that the communication and consultation procedure on migration policies 
was void. 1985 O.J. (L 217) 25. In 1985, ten States were members of the EEC: Germany, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Greece. The 
History of the European Union: 1980–1989, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/1980-1989/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). They included the six 
founding members, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, plus 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, which had all joined in 1973, and Greece, which had 
become a member in 1981. The History of the European Union: 1970–1979, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1970-1979/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 
2011); The History of the European Union: 1980–1989, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1980-1989/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). Portugal and 
Spain became members in 1986, between the time this suit was brought and the time the ECJ issued its 
judgment. Id. 
 7. Article 117 provides in pertinent part:  
Member States hereby agree upon the necessity to promote improvement of the living and 
working conditions of labour so as to permit the equalisation of such conditions in an upward 
direction. They consider that such a development will result not only from the functioning of 
the Common Market which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the 
procedures provided for under this Treaty and from the approximation of legislative and 
administrative provisions. 
EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at 48. Article 118 provides in pertinent part: 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/4
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legal provisions only concerned European Community workers who 
moved from one Member State to another. They accused the Commission 
of overreaching and encroaching upon powers left to the Member States 
because the Commission sought information about policy initiatives 
concerning the migration of individuals from non-Member States.  
To this American observer, the Commission‘s decision was minimal 
and non-intrusive. In essence, the Commission wanted information: who 
was entering the EEC, how were they treated, and what policies were 
proposed. Even during the decades of state pre-eminence in immigration 
processing in the United States, federal legislation required states to 
provide information on arriving passengers in order to record the numbers 
and origins of immigrants.
8
 Admittedly, it would be foolish to infer 
support for twentieth century European Community policies from 
nineteenth century United States legislation. Nonetheless, the new efforts 
to build an effective common market in Europe necessarily meant that 
both the national governments of the Member States and the central 
government institutions in Brussels would need to focus on the movement 
of workers, including immigrant labor, in and out of Member States. It 
was hard to see how sharing information impinged on national 
prerogatives. The American perspective was not shared by the ECJ, 
however.  
 
 
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with its general 
objectives, it shall be the aim of the Commission to promote close collaboration between 
Member States in the social field, particularly in matters relating to: employment; labour 
legislation and working conditions; occupational and continuation training; social security; 
protection against occupational accidents and diseases; industrial hygiene; the law as to trade 
unions, and collective bargaining between employers and workers. For this purpose, the 
Commission shall act in close contact with Member States by means of studies, the issuing of 
opinions and the organising of consultations both on problems arising at the national level 
and on those of concern to international organisations. Before issuing the opinions provided 
for under this Article, the Commission shall consult the Economic and Social Committee. 
Id. art. 118. 
 8. The State of New York alone processed approximately eight million immigrants through the 
Castle Garden Emigrant Landing Depot before the federal government took control of migration and 
opened Ellis Island in 1892. Castle Clinton National Monument, History & Culture, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/cacl/historyculture/ 
index.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). In 1819, federal legislation required ship captains to supply to the 
Collector of Customs a list of all passengers arriving in the United States, including their sex, 
occupation, age, and country of origin. U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 
STAFF REPORT OF SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 97th CONG., 169 
(Apr. 30, 1981), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_ 
01/0000019b/80/2f/b7/81.pdf (accessed through the U.S. Dep‘t of Educ., Educ. Res. Info. Ctr.). 
Information was collected at Atlantic and Gulf Ports first; after 1850, immigration through Pacific 
ports was added; and after 1900, information about immigration via Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, 
Mexico, and Canada was collected. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The ECJ judgment of July 9, 1987 ruled that the Commission‘s 
decision requiring information concerning immigrants from non-Member 
States exceeded the Commission‘s authority.9 The judgment upheld the 
power of the Commission to collect limited kinds of information directly 
relating to the workforce,
10
 but the ECJ agreed with the Member States 
that migration of individuals from outside the Member States—including 
information gathering about this phenomenon—was beyond the authority 
of the Commission and other EC institutions. This power resided in the 
Member States.  
The contrast between this 1987 ECJ judgment and the 2009 Elgafaji 
judgment could hardly be greater. The Elgafajis, Iraqi nationals, claimed a 
right to reside in an EU Member State. The Member State in question did 
not challenge the competence of the EU to create asylum law nor the 
applicability of this EU legislation to Member States. Rather, a Member 
State institution, the Dutch Council of State, affirmatively reached out to 
the ECJ for a definitive interpretation of the substantive law Dutch 
government officials apply to temporary migrants from outside the EU. 
Moreover, the European law in question involves much more than 
exchanges of information; it imposes obligations on Member States to 
accept and give shelter to individuals from non-Member States, despite the 
fact that their entry is not premised on their employment skills or their 
impact on the EU workforce.  
The road from the 1987 judgment to the 2009 Elgafaji judgment was 
paved by treaty amendments and legislation. Together they transformed 
EU competence concerning migrants and, in particular, asylum seekers. 
They have produced an enormous shift in power from the Member States 
to the EU, and this has generated an astounding burst of EU lawmaking 
regarding asylum policy. 
In hindsight, the 1987 ECJ ruling marked the end of an era. When the 
ECJ ruled on the Commission‘s information gathering and sharing 
procedures in 1987, the law in effect was the EEC Treaty, also called the 
Treaty of Rome, the 1957 Treaty establishing the EEC.
11
 Since 1987 there 
 
 
 9. Case 281/85, Fed. Republic of Ger. and Others v. Comm‘n of the European Cmtys., 1987 
E.C.R. 3203. Specifically, the court held that the European Commission had violated the terms of the 
Treaty of Rome when it tried to collect this information. Id. ¶ 24. Furthermore, the court held that the 
Commission‘s communication and consultation procedures had interfered with the Member States‘ 
power to the extent the procedures attempted to ensure that national agreements conform to 
community policies, such as the policy on development aid. Id. ¶ 33.  
 10. The Commission had success on only one issue: collecting information concerning the 
integration of immigrants from non-Member States into the workforce of the Member States was 
permissible because it related to the functioning of the common market. Id. ¶ 21. 
 11. EEC Treaty, supra note 6.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/4
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has been a whirlwind of treaty negotiations and ratifications in Europe, 
accompanied by many vigorous disagreements about the extent of powers 
the Member States were willing to assign to EU institutions. Ultimately, 
there were compromises and changes, which led to multiple treaties that 
re-worked institutional power arrangements: the Single European Act in 
1986,
12
 the Treaty on European Union in 1992,
13
 the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1997,
14
 and the Nice Treaty in 2001.
15
 The 2007 Treaty of Lisbon 
reforming EU institutions, initially derailed by Irish voters in 2008,
16
 met a 
happier fate when Ireland held a second referendum the next year.
17
 When 
the Treaty of Lisbon took effect in December 2009, it incorporated the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU law, reorganized the EU 
courts, created two new positions, EU President and EU Foreign Affairs 
Minister, and made substantial other changes in EU institutions.
18
 
Coincident with the changes in the EU power structure has been an 
expansion of the EU‘s geographic reach. When the Commission published 
its 1985 decision seeking information and consultation regarding 
immigrants from non-Member States, the Brussels commissioners wanted 
to obtain information from ten Member States.
19
 By the time the ECJ 
 
 
 12. 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. 
 13. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 (entered into force Nov. 1, 
1993) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. 
 14. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter 
Treaty of Amsterdam]. 
 15. Treaty of Nice, Mar. 10, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Nice]. 
 16. For the text of the treaty, see Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter 
Treaty of Lisbon]. Ireland rejected the Treaty of Lisbon in June 2008, but the Irish government 
decided to present it again in a referendum in October 2009. Steven Castle, With a Nod to Ireland, 
European Union Lifts Hopes for a Treaty to Strengthen Itself, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A12. By 
the time of the second referendum, twenty-three of the twenty-seven Member States had ratified the 
Treaty of Lisbon and deposited their ratification instruments in Rome. The parliaments of Germany, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic had approved the treaty, but their presidents had not yet signed the 
instruments of ratification. Treaty of Lisbon Taking Europe into the 21st Century, In Your Country, 
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPA, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/countries/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).  
 17. Eric Pfanner & Sarah Lyall, Irish Vote for Treaty Centralizing Power in the European Union, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at A6.  
 18. For example, article 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon amended article 6 of the Maastricht Treaty to 
recognize the principles set forth in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, added a new article 9F 
outlining the EU judicial bodies, specified in article 9E the role of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and detailed in article 9B the duties of the president of 
the European Council. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 16, art. 1 (as in effect 2007).  
 19. In 1985, the Member States included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Greece. See The History of the European 
Union: 1980–1989, supra note 6.  
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issued its 1987 judgment, Spain and Portugal had joined, bringing the 
number to twelve.
20
 In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined.
21
 Ten 
more States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus, joined in 2004, followed 
by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
22
 Thus, in two decades the EU 
expanded from ten to twenty-seven nations. The area covered by the EU 
grew from less than two million to more than four million square 
kilometers.
23
 In population terms, the reach of EU institutions in Brussels 
expanded almost 100%: from 266 million to approximately 500 million 
people.
24
 As the scope of the lawmaking authority of the EU has increased, 
the EU‘s geographic and demographic reach has multiplied.  
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU ASYLUM LAW 
Two treaties embodied momentous changes for asylum seekers in the 
EU. Five years after the 1987 ECJ consultation decision, the Treaty on 
European Union, known as the Maastricht Treaty, stated for the first time 
that Member States regard immigration and asylum policy as matters of 
common interest. The Maastricht Treaty‘s approach envisioned an EU 
framework supported by three pillars, and specified that asylum policy fell 
within the third pillar which concerned matters of ―justice and home 
affairs.‖25 The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, signed ten years after the ECJ 
 
 
 20. Spain and Portugal entered the European Union on Jan. 1, 1986. Id. 
 21. The History of the European Union: 1990–1999, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1990-1999/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).  
 22. Id. at The History of the European Union: 2000–Today, http://europa.eu/abc/history/2000_ 
today/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
 23. The combined geographical size of the ten EU Member States in 1985 totaled 1,748,800 
square kilometers. See How Big is the EU?, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/sizeandpopulation/howbig/index_en.htm#chart1 (last visited Feb. 4, 
2011). 
 24. According to Eurostat, the official statistics institution of the European Union, as of early 
2009 the EU population stood at 499,794,855. For current statistics, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
EUROSTAT, Total Population Chart, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
(click ―Total Population‖) (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). For geographical statistics, see How Big Is the 
EU?, supra note 23.  
 25. The Maastricht Treaty, supra note 13, introduced the notion that the EU framework consisted 
of three pillars. SIDORENKO, supra note 3, at 19. The first pillar included the matters that had been 
regulated by the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the 
EURATOM; the EU institutions had competence to regulate matters within the first pillar. Id. The 
second pillar focused on foreign and security policy, while the third pillar concerned policies affecting 
justice and home affairs (―JHA‖). Id. Both the second and third pillars were mainly intergovernmental 
in nature; policy was largely made by the Member States, not by the EU institutions. Id. at 19–20. 
Within the third pillar, article K.1 listed the following areas as matters of common interest that relate 
to the free movement of persons:  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/4
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consultation decision, specified that freedom of movement within the EU 
necessarily requires harmonization of asylum, immigration, and visa 
policies, in order to make the EU an ―area of freedom, security, and 
justice.‖26 Thus, the Amsterdam Treaty was the first to contemplate that 
the movement of asylum seekers would fall directly within the jurisdiction 
of EU institutions.
27
  
Two years after Member States signed the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
European Council (EC or the Council) met in Tampere, Finland to 
articulate guidelines concerning the free movement of persons throughout 
the EU. The Tampere Conclusions acknowledged that the free movement 
of individuals implicated the rights of those who seek access to and 
protection in the EU, and explicitly called for the development of EU law 
on asylum. The Tampere Conclusions specified:  
This System should include, in the short term, a clear and workable 
determination of the State responsible for the examination of an 
asylum application, common standards for a fair and efficient 
asylum procedure, common minimum conditions of reception of 
asylum seekers, and the approximation of rules on the recognition 
and content of the refugee status. It should also be completed with 
measures on subsidiary forms of protection offering an appropriate 
status to any person in need of such protection. . . .
28
 
 
 
asylum policy; crossing by persons of external borders and the exercise of controls thereon; 
immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries; combating drug 
addiction; combating fraud on an international scale; judicial cooperation in civil matters; 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters; customs cooperation; and police cooperation for the 
purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking, and other serious 
forms of international crime. 
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 13, art. K.1. Article K.2 required Member States to adhere to the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the European Human Rights Convention in addressing the policies listed in 
article K.1. Id. art. K.2. 
 26. The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the policies concerning the free movement of persons 
from the third pillar (intergovernmental matters) to the first pillar (EU matters). SIDORENKO, supra 
note 3, at 20. Article 73 refers to measures on immigration and asylum Treaty of Amsterdam, supra 
note 14, art. 73. Articles 1 and 2 introduce the concept of the EU as an area of ―freedom, security and 
justice,‖ but do not define these terms, which reappear two years later in the guidelines for free 
movement of persons adopted at the European Council meeting in Tampere, Finland. See infra note 28 
and accompanying text.  
 27. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 14, art. 73k, tit. III. 
 28. Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council ¶ 14 (Oct. 15–16, 1999), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm [hereinafter Tampere Conclusions].  
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 In the longer term, Community rules should lead to a common 
asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted 
asylum valid throughout the Union.
29
 
The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and the Tampere European 
Council meeting did not occur in a political vacuum. The EU had been 
established to create an internal market with free movement of people as 
well as goods, services, and capital, and there were continuing efforts to 
make a more effective common market. To this end, several of the original 
EU Member States agreed at Schengen, Luxembourg to enhance the 
security of their common external borders and remove all internal border 
controls.
30
 In 1995, the internal border checkpoints were removed between 
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, and 
Portugal.
31
 The economic benefits of passport-free travel encouraged other 
States to join the Schengen Area,
32
 and by 2007, it was possible to travel 
from the Iberian Peninsula to the Baltic Sea without stopping for internal 
border controls.
33
  
The steady reduction in passport controls exacerbated concerns about 
asylum and illegal migration. While citizens of EU Member States have 
broad rights to migrate to other Member States,
34
 this is not true for 
citizens from non-Member States. Indeed, many Member States lack laws 
that permit immigration from beyond the EU.
35
 Because they do not 
 
 
 29. Id. ¶ 15.  
 30. France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the Schengen 
Agreement in 1985. This was followed by the Schengen Convention to implement the border control 
changes in 1990. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the suppression of internal border 
controls into the law of the EU. Other countries applied to join the Schengen area, including two non-
EU states, Norway and Iceland. By late 2007, the Schengen area included twenty-four countries. 
Summaries of EU Legislation: The Schengen Area and Cooperation, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_ 
of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.htm.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Countries believed that joining the Schengen zone would increase business and tourism. 
Open Borders Extended Within European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at A15, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/world/europe/21border.html. 
 33. Italy joined the Schengen area in 1990, Greece in 1992, Austria in 1995, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden in 1996, and in December 2007, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia became part of the Schengen zone. Id.  
 34. The free movement of persons is one of the core principles of European Union law. European 
Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 9 April 2004 on the Right of Citizens of the Union 
and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, 
2004 O.J. (L 158) 78–80.  
 35. For example, Germany, with the largest national economy in the EU, introduced its first 
immigration law in 2002. Veysel Oezcan, German Immigration Law Clears Final Hurdle, MIGRATION 
POLICY INSTITUTE (Sept. 2002), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=51. 
Similarly, Spain did not enact an immigration law until 1985, and its provisions focused on temporary 
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perceive themselves as countries of immigration, they do not have 
legislation and policies to attract non-citizens to become permanent 
residents and perhaps, ultimately, citizens.
36
 They do have asylum laws, 
however, and, as a consequence, asylum is often the only avenue for 
noncitizens to obtain legal residence. This puts substantial pressure on the 
asylum systems.  
As the Soviet Union collapsed, the EU worried that it would be 
engulfed with asylum seekers. Similarly, when Yugoslavia imploded, 
hundreds of thousands of refugees fled into EU Member States.
37
 The 
Austrian government estimated that four million asylum seekers had 
entered the EU in the early 1990s, and called for joint action.
38
 Meanwhile, 
negative public opinion about refugee camps and asylum seekers who did 
not present bona fide claims intensified government concerns that 
trafficking organizations had grown more sophisticated in their delivery of 
asylum seekers and other migrants to Europe.
39
 These pressures convinced 
Member States of the desirability of a common asylum policy for the EU.  
These and other developments generated the political will to forge the 
CEAS. In turn, this new regional approach to asylum has led to the 
creation of multiple new EU institutions and to the preparation of a 
multitude of statutes, a veritable New Deal of law-making. The legislation 
comprising the CEAS has adopted a minimum standards approach: 
Member States are free to assume greater obligations, but they must 
comply at least with the standards set forth in the EU Directives.
40
 The 
minimum standards approach sacrifices uniformity for flexibility. In 
 
 
migration. Nieves Ortega Perez, Spain: Forging an Immigration Policy, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE (Feb. 2003), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=97. Many 
European countries allowed non-citizens to become lawful residents based on marriage to a citizen, but 
these provisions were not envisioned as a national immigration policy.  
 36. Many European countries had programs to encourage temporary migrants, often known as 
guest workers, but the intention behind these programs was that the ―guests‖ would return home. See, 
e.g., Veysel Oezcan, Germany: Immigration in Transition, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (July 2004), 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=235. 
 37. According to UNHCR statistics, EU countries sheltered 584,017 Bosnians in 1997. JOANNE 
VAN SELM, KOSOVO‘S REFUGEES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 229 tbl.5 (2000). 
 38. AUSTRIAN EU PRESIDENCY, STRATEGY PAPER ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM (July 1, 
1998); see Claude Moraes, The Politics of European Union Migration Policy, 2003 POL. Q. 116, 118. 
 39. Moraes, supra note 38, at 118–19. 
 40. EU Directives often set minimum standards for all the Member States, and a few words about 
EU legislation will illustrate how this approach works. The EU institutions can issue Directives or 
Regulations. Directives, which impose an obligation upon the Member States to conform their laws to 
the requirements established by the terms of the Directive, generally become effective via national 
legislation enacted by the Member States. In contrast, EU Regulations require no implementing 
legislation in order to be effective in Member States. MATHIJSEN, supra note 4, chs. 3–4; ALINA 
KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW ch. 10 (Routledge-Cavendish 2009).  
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addition, there is always a concern that each of the Member States will 
adopt the lowest acceptable standard. This threat raised fears that the 
minimum standards established by the CEAS would encourage the 
Member States to reduce the more robust protection of asylum seekers, 
which their national laws may have previously provided.
41
 The 
negotiations concerning the acceptable minimum standards may also have 
exacerbated minor disagreements on some issues, as Member States 
engaged in strategic posturing on one point to gain leverage elsewhere.
42
 
In short, negotiating the minimum standards for the CEAS was a deeply 
political process because, ultimately, the consent of all Member States was 
necessary and each had reasons to prefer its own status quo. Nonetheless, 
the perspective from 2009—a decade after Tampere—reveals significant 
accomplishments. At first, the EU efforts were halting and fitful, and 
critics referred to these efforts as the ―so-called Tampere process.‖43 By 
2009, however, five major EU asylum laws had come into effect.
44
 
A. Temporary Protection 
The first EU asylum legislation was the Temporary Protection 
Directive of 2001,
45
 a law that in large part was a response to European 
fratricide in the 1990s. The refugees escaping the Bosnia and Kosovo wars 
often fled hastily and in great numbers, with disproportionate impacts on 
EU Member States. For example, Germany received 340,000 Bosnians in 
comparison to 15,000 who arrived in France, and 6,000 who reached the 
United Kingdom.
46
 The 1999 fighting in Kosovo generated even larger 
forced migrations, with 900,000 Kosovars crossing borders within a matter 
of weeks.
47
 The largest numbers of war refugees went to non-EU 
countries, such as Albania and Montenegro, but the distribution of those 
 
 
 41. Piotrowicz & van Eck, supra note 3, at 114. 
 42. See, e.g., McAdam, supra note 3, at 497–514.  
 43. E.g., Migration Policy Group, Asylum/Refugees, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Nov. 2001, at 
10–19. 
 44. See infra Part II.A–E. 
 45. Council Directive 2001/55/EC on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in 
the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts 
Between Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof, 2001 O.J. 
(L 212) 12–23, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001: 
212:0012:0023:EN:PDF [hereinafter Temporary Protection Directive]. 
 46. According to UNHCR statistics, in 1997 Germany sheltered 342,500 of the 584,000 Bosnians 
in the EU. Thus, Germany received 60% of the total. Other EU countries that received sizeable 
numbers of Bosnian refugees included Austria (88,609), Sweden (60,671), the Netherlands (25,000), 
and Denmark (21,458). VAN SELM, supra note 37, at 229 tbl.5.  
 47. Id. at 225 tbl.1. 
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seeking protection within the EU was again uneven. Germany received 
14,689, which was the largest share of those evacuated to EU countries, 
6,339 arrived in France, 4,346 reached the United Kingdom, 1,426 went to 
Spain, and 1,033 to Ireland.
48
  
Enacted two years after the Kosovo conflict, the Temporary Protection 
Directive provides a mechanism for EU-wide response to dire situations. 
Specifically, mass arrivals of individuals fleeing armed conflict, endemic 
violence, and systematic violations of their human rights may lead to 
short-term protection programs in the EU.
49
 If the European Council 
declares that the preconditions to trigger EU-wide temporary protection 
have been established, all Member States must grant lawful residence to 
members of the designated group for one year, which may be extended by 
six-month periods for a maximum of one more year.
50
 During that time, 
persons granted temporary protection will be provided with residence 
permits,
51
 as well as basic welfare, medical care, and housing.
52
 They will 
not be able to move freely within the EU,
53
 and the Council may vote to 
end the period of protection at any time.
54
  
The terms of the Temporary Protection Directive place considerable 
limits on its actual availability. First, the Temporary Protection Directive 
does not apply unless a mass influx of people seek protection.
55
 Discrete, 
small-scale disasters do not trigger its protections, which are premised on 
large-scale emergency situations in which the number of forced migrants 
makes it impracticable to hold individual hearings on their qualifications 
for asylum.
56
 Second, and more significantly, the Temporary Protection 
Directive places all relevant decision-making authority in a political body, 
 
 
 48. Id. at 224 tbl.1. Of the 900,000 Kosovars who fled Kosovo in the spring of 1999, roughly 
800,000 remained in neighboring states, including Albania and Macedonia. Of the 90,000-100,000 
who were evacuated from the neighboring states, approximately 55,000 went to EU countries. Id. at 
225. 
 49. The Temporary Protection Directive states that its purpose is to provide temporary protection 
to mass influxes of displaced persons. Temporary Protection Directive, supra note 45, pmbl. The 
Directive defines displaced persons, referring specifically to (i) persons who have fled areas of armed 
conflict or endemic violence, and (ii) persons at serious risk of systematic or generalized human rights 
violations. Id. art. 2(c). 
 50. In exceptional circumstances, temporary protection can be extended for a third and final year. 
Id. art. 4.  
 51. Id. art. 8. 
 52. Id. art. 13 (suitable accommodations, basic medical care, and social assistance). Additionally, 
article 14 calls for education for individuals under 18. Id. art. 14. 
 53. Id. art. 11 (Member States must take back those to whom it granted temporary residence 
permits if they seek to enter another Member State). 
54. Temporary Protection Directive, supra note 45, art. 6 (procedure to terminate protection). 
 55. Id. art. 2. 
 56. Id. 
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the European Council.
57
 The European Council, composed of the heads of 
government of all the Member States,
58
 must decide that a situation 
warrants the provision of temporary refuge by EU countries. Moreover, a 
Council decision to invoke the Temporary Protection Directive must pass 
by a qualified majority, which requires more than a fifty percent vote.
59
 
The choice to entrust this power to the Council rather than the 
Commission guarantees that it will be rarely used. The reality is that mass 
disasters, ethnic cleansing, and other events that force large groups of 
people to flee their homes have a disproportionate impact on nearby 
countries. The past has proved that EU States reeling from the localized 
impacts of refugee flows find it difficult to convince the geographically 
distant Member States that joint action is warranted. The future is not 
likely to be different.  
In recent years, Malta, the smallest EU Member State, has repeatedly 
faced mass influxes of asylum seekers and has contended that other EU 
Member States should assist Malta in responding to the crisis.
60
 Malta‘s 
location in the Mediterranean Sea, 200 kilometers north of Libya and 100 
kilometers south of Sicily, has made it a landing point for thousands of 
asylum seekers departing from North Africa by boat.
61
 It appears likely 
that armed conflict, endemic violence, or systematic human rights 
 
 
 57. Id. art. 5 (implementation of temporary protection by Council Decision).  
 58. The Treaty of Lisbon established the European Council as an EU policy making body, 
separate from the Council of Ministers, a legislative body. Each EU Member State sends either the 
head of state or a high-ranking minister to these Council meetings. The newly elected President of the 
European Council heads the Council, and the President of the EU Commission attends as a non-voting 
member. See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 59. Under the Treaty of Nice, a qualified majority consists of the backing of more than 50% of 
the EU Member States, plus approximately 74% of the weighted votes assigned to the Member States 
(74% represents the required number of votes after enlargement of the Union in 2007, which resulted 
in a requirement for 255 out of 345 weighted votes). Furthermore, a Member State may request that 
the ―Member States constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62% of the total population of 
the Union,‖ which would then be required in order to adopt the resolution. Treaty of Nice, supra note 
15, protocols, art. 3. The Treaty of Lisbon expanded the use of qualified majority voting; new 
definitions of qualified majority voting will come into effect in 2014. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 
13, art. 16 (as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 18, art. 6).  
 60. See, e.g., Migration Policy Group, Migration Policies/Law, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Sept. 
2006, at 1–12 (covering African migration to southern EU Member States, and efforts by those 
Member States to obtain assistance from other EU countries); Dan Bilefsky, European Union Split on 
Solution to African and Iraqi Refugee Influx, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/world/europe/13eu.html.  
 61. More than 5,000 boat people have arrived in Malta since 2000. Almost 2,000 arrived in 2005. 
More than 1,000 arrived in the first six months of 2009. Many appear to have left North Africa for 
Italy, but have been blown off course to Malta. Others have been shipwrecked in the seas surrounding 
Malta, rescued, and brought to Malta. By mid-summer 2006, more than 1,500 were in detention in 
Malta. Vanya Walker-Leigh, Refugees: Tiny Malta Is Finally Heard, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS 
AGENCY, July 20, 2009, http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=34036.  
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violations may have impelled many of these individuals to flee. 
Nonetheless, there was no realistic possibility that a majority of EU States 
would invoke the Temporary Protection Directive in response to these 
surges of displaced persons. Several EU countries have entered into small 
ad hoc arrangements to accept asylum seekers from Malta,
62
 but EU-wide 
responses have been lacking.
63
  
 In early 2011 similar tensions again surfaced, this time in Italy. The 
protests and conflicts of the ―Arab spring‖ contributed to boatloads of 
refugees and migrants leaving North Africa for Italian shores. When more 
than 22,000 individuals landed in Italy in three months, the Italian 
government vociferously criticized the absence of an EU-wide response to 
this mass influx.
64
 The Temporary Protection Directive played no role.  
American readers may note similarities between the Temporary 
Protection Directive and the Temporary Protected Status (―TPS‖) 
approach adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1990.
65
 They both envision a 
non-permanent safe haven.
66
 They both require a political decision to set 
them in motion.
67
 Once triggered, they both provide for short-term 
residence permits and employment authorization. It will not surprise many 
 
 
 62. In July 2006, Malta refused to accept fifty-one Africans rescued from a sinking ship in 
nearby waters, which finally convinced the EU to schedule sea patrols nearby in order to intercept 
unauthorized vessels heading for Malta. Spain agreed to accept forty-five of the rescued individuals, 
and the EU repatriated the rest to Morocco. Id. France also agreed to resettle ninety-two refugees from 
Malta in 2009. Migration Policy Group, ―Burden-Sharing‖: France Will Take More Refugees From 
Malta, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Aug. 2009, at 9. 
 63. The scale of the arrivals of displaced persons in Malta is smaller than that experienced in the 
Kosovo and Bosnia conflicts, but Malta‘s population of 400,000 is also much smaller than that of 
Germany (82 million), France (64 million), and other EU Member States that provided temporary 
protection in the earlier crises.  
 64. Rachel Donadio, Italy lashes Out at European Union Over Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
2011, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/europe/12italy.html.  
 65. Section 302 of the Immigration Act of 1990 created a mechanism for awarding temporary 
protection in a variety of circumstances. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, § 302, 104 Stat. 
4678, 5030 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254) (2006) (repealed by Pub. L. 104-208, D.U.C, title III, 
§ 308(6)–(7)). The details of temporary protected status are codified in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, § 244. Pub. L. 101-649, § 244 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)) (2006) [hereinafter 
INA].  
 66. Under TPS, the initial period of protection must be not less than 6 months and not more than 
18 months. INA § 244(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(2) (2006). Article 4 of the EU Temporary Protection 
Directive contemplates a one-year duration that can be extended for an additional year. See supra note 
50 and accompanying text. 
 67. The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate government agencies, has the sole 
power to designate groups eligible for TPS. INA § 244(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (2006). The 
Temporary Protection Directive requires the European Council to make all relevant decisions. 
Temporary Protection Directive, supra note 45, art. 5. 
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to learn that access to the labor market is more robust in the United 
States,
68
 while access to social assistance is more secure in the EU.
69
 
Several important differences bear mention. TPS is not limited to mass 
influx situations as it applies to a broad range of humanitarian crises, from 
armed conflict to natural and environmental disasters.
70
 Furthermore, TPS 
has been invoked in response to many separate crises since 1990, ranging 
from civil war victims in Liberia, to Kosovars fleeing Serbian armed 
forces, to Hondurans reeling from hurricane damage, and, most recently, 
to Haitians displaced by the catastrophic earthquake on January 12, 
2010.
71
 All told, more than 400,000 have benefited from TPS in the past 
two decades.
72
 The TPS approach is no panacea and it has generated 
serious criticisms,
73
 but it is much easier to trigger than the EU Temporary 
Protection mechanism because the U.S. government can make the decision 
to extend temporary protection on its own, while the European Council 
has to muster a majority of votes from twenty-seven Member States. The 
 
 
 68. Those granted TPS have unlimited authorization to work throughout the TPS period, INA 
§§ 244(a)(1)(B), (2), whereas EU Member States can limit access to the labor market for those granted 
temporary protection. Temporary Protection Directive, supra note 45, art. 12.  
 69. The INA is silent concerning social benefits, whereas EU Member States must provide 
access to welfare and social benefits. Id. art. 13(2). 
 70. INA § 244(b)(1) outlines three categories of potential eligibility: section (A) refers to armed 
conflict; section (B) refers to ―earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster 
resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected‖ and the 
foreign state officially requests assistance; section (C) refers to other ―extraordinary and temporary 
conditions in the foreign state.‖ INA § 244(b)(1)(A)–(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2006). The 
second category, covering natural and environmental disasters, can only come into effect if the 
affected state requests TPS designation. INA § 244(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(B)(iii) 
(2006). This is not a prerequisite for situations of armed conflict. INA § 244(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1254a(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 71. The countries or territories designated under the TPS program have included Angola, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Burundi, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Montserrat, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Ruth Ellen Wasem & Karma 
Ester, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND ISSUES 4 (2008). On January 21, 2010, DHS designated Haiti for temporary protected 
status for eighteen months, with registration running from January 21 through July 20, 2010. 
Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg. 3476 (Jan. 21, 2010). 
 72. See Wasem & Ester, supra note 71, at 5; Susan Martin, Andy Schoenholtz & Deborah Waller 
Myers, Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 543, 549–50 (1998). Mark Krikorian, Here to Stay: There’s Nothing as Permanent as a 
Temporary Refugee, Center for Immigration Studies (Aug. 1999), http://www.cis.org/articles/1999/ 
back899.html.  
 73. For analyses and criticisms of this program, see Linton Joaquin, Mark Silverman & Lisa 
Klapal, Temporary Protected Status (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/ 
jsp/fileDL.php?fID=1123; Joan Fitzpatrick, The End of Protection: Legal Standards for Cessation of 
Refugee Status and Withdrawal of Temporary Protection, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343 (1999); Martin, 
Schoenholtz & Myers, supra note 72, at 543.  
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challenge is to make Temporary Protection in the EU more than a 
theoretical response to forced migration. 
B. Reception of Asylum Seekers  
In 2003, two years after the adoption of the Temporary Protection 
Directive, the EU adopted legislation imposing minimum standards 
concerning the conditions in which asylum seekers live while they present 
their applications for asylum.
74
 Known as the Reception Directive, this law 
requires Member States to provide asylum seekers documents attesting to 
their status during the asylum process,
75
 and to inform them of individuals 
and organizations that can assist them.
76
 Member States must ensure that 
asylum seekers have access to adequate accommodations,
77
 and they must 
try to keep families together.
78
 Member States may confine asylum seekers 
to a particular location, but asylum seekers should be able to move freely 
within the area or district where they reside.
79
 Staff members of reception 
centers must be adequately trained,
80
 and lawyers, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representatives, and members of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must have access to facilities 
housing asylum seekers in order to assist them in their claims.
81
 
Medical screening may be required,
82
 but basic health care must be 
provided.
83
 Special services must be offered to victims of torture or 
violence,
84
 to children who may have been abused or exploited,
85
 and to 
unaccompanied minors.
86
 In general, minor children of asylum seekers 
must be guaranteed the same access to education as children from the 
 
 
 74. Council Directive 2003/9/EC Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of 
Asylum Seekers, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18–25, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:031:0018:0025:EN:PDF [hereinafter Reception Directive].  
 75. Within three days of filing the asylum application, applicants must receive a document 
authorizing their residence during the asylum process. Id. art. 6. 
 76. Within fifteen days of filing the asylum application, they must receive information on their 
rights and obligations and on organizations that can provide assistance. Id. art. 5. 
 77. The reception conditions must ensure a standard of living adequate for the health of 
applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence. Id. art. 13(2). 
 78. Id. art. 8. 
 79. Id. art. 7(1)–(2). 
 80. Reception Directive, supra note 74, art. 14(5). 
 81. Id. art. 14(7). 
 82. Id. art. 9. 
 83. Necessary health care ―shall include, at least, emergency care and essential treatment for 
illness.‖ Id. art. 15(1).  
 84. Id. art. 20. 
 85. Id. art. 18. 
 86. Reception Directive, supra note 74, art. 19. 
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Member State, but the education may be provided at reception centers 
rather than at public schools.
87
  
With regard to employment authorization, Member States may 
preclude asylum applicants‘ access to the job market for up to one year.88 
After this time, if the authorities have not yet ruled on the asylum 
application, the applicant can have conditional access to the labor market, 
provided the delay was not caused by the asylum seeker.
89
 Employment 
priority can be accorded to EU nationals and certain other legal residents.
90
  
The impetus for the Reception Directive was to eliminate incentives for 
forum-shopping among Member States and its goal is to harmonize 
standards throughout the EU so as to avoid creating ―magnet‖ locations for 
filing asylum claims.
91
 No empirical work has assessed whether this goal 
has been achieved, but it appears unlikely that the Reception Directive has 
had much impact on asylum seekers‘ decisions about where to apply for 
asylum. First, the harmonization achieved is probably small. The 
minimum standards are not stringent, which means that many of the 
national asylum systems already complied with the new law. Inertia would 
likely keep the prior reception arrangements in place.
92
  
Second, to the extent that asylum seekers have choices about where to 
file asylum claims, factors other than reception conditions are more 
powerful determinants. For example, the presence of individuals from 
their homeland or their region of origin is often a major draw,
93
 and the 
 
 
 87. Id. art. 10. 
 88. Id. art. 11(1)–(2). 
 89. Id. art. 11(2). 
 90. Id. art. 11(4). 
 91. The preamble of the Directive provides: ―The harmonisation of conditions for the reception 
of asylum seekers should help to limit the secondary movements of asylum seekers influenced by the 
variety of conditions for their reception.‖ Id. pmbl., ¶ 8. See also The Common European Asylum 
System: A Summary, MIGRATION WATCH UK, at 4 (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/ 
pdfs/4_5_common_euro_asylum_system.pdf (official site of Migration Watch UK). 
 92. It is possible, of course, that states whose asylum systems offer higher quality conditions of 
reception may, post-Reception Directive, reduce the care they provide. The European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles noted that one of its principle concerns regarding the Reception Directive was 
that ―many of the Articles fall short of the current standard of reception in many Member States 
[creating] . . . a risk that in those countries with a higher standard than that of the Directive, . . . [the] 
text could provide the rationale for reduction of reception standards.‖ See ECRE Information Notes on 
the Council Directive 2003/9/EC of Jan. 27, 2003, Laying down Minimum Standards for the Reception 
of Asylum Seekers, IN1/06/2003/EXT/HM, 3, available at http://www.ecre.org/resources/ECRE_ 
actions/291. If inertia does not inhibit the Member States from reducing the quality of their asylum 
reception systems, it seems likely that local NGOs and refugee advocates will actively protest a race to 
the bottom.  
 93. Several European studies note that the pre-existence of a community of co-nationals, or 
social networks, in a particular country can heavily influence an asylum seeker‘s destination. See 
Michael Collyer, The Dublin Regulation, Influences on Asylum Destinations and the Exception of 
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language spoken in the asylum country can be essential. The success rate 
of asylum applications is another positive factor. The opportunities for 
regularization outside the asylum process is yet another factor.
94
 The 
ability to obtain work, authorized or not, plays a role.
95
 Thus, the reception 
conditions alone are unlikely to be a decisive factor in attracting asylum 
seekers to a country. 
C. State Responsibility for Asylum  
The third element of the CEAS, also adopted in 2003, sets forth 
elaborate criteria for determining which Member State is responsible for 
deciding an individual‘s asylum application. Familiarly known as the 
Dublin II Regulation,
96
 it replaces the Dublin Convention,
97
 a 1990 treaty 
signed by twelve States in an effort to prevent asylum seekers from filing 
asylum claims in more than one country.
98
 The Dublin Convention, which 
 
 
Algerians, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 375, 383–85 (2004) (citing various studies which analyzed this issue, 
including T. Havinga & A. Bocker, Country of Asylum by Choice or by Chance: Asylum Seekers in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, 25 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 43 (1999); V. Robinson & J. 
Segrott, Understanding the Decision Making of Asylum Seekers, HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDY 243, 
in LONDON: HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS DIRECTORATE (2002); K. 
Koser & C. Pinkerton, The Social Networks of Asylum Seekers and the Dissemination of Information 
about Countries of Asylum, MIGRATION RESEARCH UNIT AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, 
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/socialnetwork.pdf (2002)). 
 94. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers 
to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, 15 INT‘L J. REFUGEE LAW 567, 571 (2003) 
(discussing various reasons why asylum seekers might choose a particular destination country, and 
mentioning ―favorable integration conditions‖ as one such factor). 
 95. See id. (noting that employment opportunities may push asylum seekers to choose a 
particular destination); Michael Collyer, supra note 93, at 384 (citing Thielemann‘s study).  
 96. Council Regulation 343/2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the 
Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the Member 
States by a Third Country National, 2008 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Dublin II Regulation].  
 97. Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum 
Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, Dublin Convention, 1997 O.J. (C 
254) 1–12 (current version at Dublin II Regulation) [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. The Dublin 
Convention went into effect in September 1997 for the original twelve state parties, followed shortly 
thereafter by three more state parties. 
 98. The Dublin Convention provided that an asylum seeker‘s application was to be examined by 
a single Member State. Id. art. 3. Another objective was to reduce refugees in orbit, bouncing from 
State to State to see which one will finally review the merits of the claim. The preamble of the 
Convention stated that the signatories were: 
aware of the need, in pursuit of this objective, to take measures to avoid any situations 
arising, with the result that applicants for asylum are left in doubt for too long as regards the 
likely outcome of their applications and concerned to provide all applicants for asylum with a 
guarantee that their applications will be examined by one of the Member States and to ensure 
that applicants for asylum are not referred successively from one Member State to another 
without any of these States acknowledging itself to be competent to examine the application 
for asylum . . . 
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went into effect in 1997, was not part of the EU legal framework although 
all parties to it were EU Member States; this rendered the ECJ without 
competence to interpret Dublin Convention provisions. In contrast, the 
Dublin II Regulation is an integral part of the CEAS which places it 
squarely within the purview of the ECJ. Indeed, the European Council 
issued this law as a regulation, which made it effective immediately.
99
 
In essence, the Dublin II Regulation is a complex venue statute. Its 
default principle is that the Member State in which the application is first 
lodged is responsible for deciding the claim,
100
 but many additional factors 
may come into play.
101
 If the asylum seeker previously received a 
residence permit, visa, or permission to enter without a visa from a 
Member State, the issuing State would be responsible for examining the 
claim.
102
 Similarly, if family members of the asylum seeker have received 
residence permits from a Member State, the State where the family resides 
would assume responsibility for the claim.
103
  
There are special rules for unaccompanied minors. If a family member 
is legally present in a Member State, that State would be responsible, so 
long as it is in the best interest of the minor.
104
 Otherwise, the State where 
the minor filed his or her asylum application is responsible,
105
 but efforts 
should be made to reunite the minor with family members in any other 
State that would be able to care for the minor.
106
 
Some of the most difficult situations arise when asylum seekers enter 
the EU without legal authority. In these circumstances, the first Member 
State entered, irrespective of where the claim is lodged, is responsible.
107
 
This responsibility lapses twelve months after the illegal entry, at which 
point the Member State in which the asylum seeker has resided for at least 
 
 
Id. pmbl. 
 99. Pursuant to article 29, the Dublin II Regulation became effective on March 17, 2003, the 
twentieth day after publication in the Official Journal of the EU. See supra note 96, art. 29. See 
generally supra note 40 (concerning the legal effect of regulations and directives under EU law). 
 100. Dublin Convention, supra note 97 art. 13 (if no other provisions of the Regulation apply, the 
first Member State where an asylum application is filed is responsible). 
 101. The Dublin II Regulation specifies a hierarchy of criteria to be weighed in each case. Id. arts. 
5–14. And, of course, if any State volunteers to decide an asylum claim even though not required to do 
so, that is permissible. Id. art. 3(4). 
 102. Id. art. 9 (prescribing the sequence of responsibility if more than one State has issued 
residence permits or visa, and so on). 
 103. Id. art. 7. 
 104. Id. art. 6(1). 
 105. Id. art. 6(2). 
 106. Dublin Convention art. 15(3). 
 107. Id. art. 10. 
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five continuous months becomes responsible.
108
 There are further 
provisions if the claimant has lived in several Member States for more 
than five months.
109
 Determining when and where asylum seekers entered 
Member States can be extremely challenging, and the Dublin II Regulation 
specifies the criteria and procedures for evaluating circumstantial evidence 
and other proof that may be relevant.
110
  
The Dublin II Regulation is complicated, and asylum seekers caught up 
in the so-called Dublin procedures can spend a significant amount of time 
in limbo.
111
 In these situations, they are waiting solely for the answer to a 
threshold question: which forum is appropriate? Dublin II decisions may 
take months, and they never address the need for protection. A decision is 
merely a prelude to an examination of the substance of the application in 
question.
112
  
D. Defining Those in Need of Protection 
In the spring of 2004, just before ten new States joined the European 
Union, the Qualification Directive articulated the fourth element of the 
new asylum framework, defining those who qualify for protection in the 
EU.
113
 It also prescribes the minimum legal protections that Member 
 
 
 108. Id. art. 10(2). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. art. 18(2)–(3).  
 111. Limitation periods apply to the procedures for determining state responsibility for asylum. 
Member States have three months in which to request another Member State to take custody of the 
asylum seeker and assume responsibility for deciding his or her case. Id. art. 17(1). Failure to respond 
within two months to a request to take charge of an asylum claim is deemed consent. Id. art. 18(7). 
There are detailed provisions concerning Member States taking charge of and taking back asylum 
seekers who have lodged asylum claims elsewhere. Id. arts. 17–19. ―Taking charge‖ involves the 
assumption of legal responsibility to process an asylum application. This entails a situation where a 
Member State is responsible for the application of an asylum seeker according to the provisions of EU 
regulations, but the asylum seeker has lodged an application in another Member State. In essence, the 
responsible State must ―take charge‖ of its duties to handle the claim of that asylum seeker. ―Taking 
back,‖ on the other hand, deals with the relocation of the actual asylum seeker and requires the 
Member State responsible for the individual‘s application to ―take back‖ such a person into the 
territory of the responsible Member State under various conditions described in article 20.  
 112. In December 2008, the European Commission issued a proposal to amend the Dublin 
Regulation to increase its efficiency and to take into account the pressures on the reception capacities 
of particular Member States. The proposal includes an individual‘s right to appeal a transfer decision 
made pursuant to the Dublin Regulation and a corresponding right to consult legal advisors. Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria and 
Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for 
International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a 
Stateless Person, COM (2008) 820 final (Dec. 3, 2008). 
 113. Council Directive 8043/04, of the Council of the European Union on Minimum Standards for 
the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons 
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States must afford to refugees and those in refugee-like situations. The 
Qualification Directive relies on the familiar international definition for 
those entitled to refugee status: 
[A] third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside of the 
country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country. . . .
114
  
The innovation of the Qualification Directive, and the focus of the ECJ 
Elgafaji case, is the new legal category known as subsidiary protection.
115
 
It is available for individuals ―who [do] not qualify as a refugee but in 
respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin . . . would 
face a real risk of suffering serious harm. . . .‖116  
The Qualification Directive requires Member States to grant three-year 
renewable residence permits to those determined to be refugees
117
 and 
one-year renewable residence permits to those with subsidiary protection 
status.
118
 Refugees must receive employment authorization,
119
 social 
welfare,
120
 education,
121
 and have access to travel documents.
122
 In 
contrast, those granted subsidiary protection status have the right to work, 
but the State may limit employment opportunities based on the national 
 
 
Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, Apr. 27, 
2004, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st08/st08043.en04.pdf [hereinafter 
Qualification Directive].  
 114. Id. art. 2(c). Note the congruence with article 1(A)(2) of the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, July 28 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention], which 
defines as refugees those individuals who ―owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion‖ are 
unable to seek the protection of their country.  
 115. An analysis of the subsidiary protection status and its legislative history can be found in 
McAdam, supra note 3.  
 116. Qualification Directive, supra note 113, art. 2(e). 
 117. Id. art. 24(1). Although the Qualification Directive goes beyond the mandate of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, by requiring three-year renewable residence permits for refugees, it does not 
break new ground; the EU Member States all offer stable residence rights to those recognized as 
refugees. 
 118. Id. art. 24(2). 
 119. Id. art. 26(1). 
 120. Id. art. 28(1). 
 121. Id. art. 27. 
 122. Id. art. 25(1). They must also receive the same treatment as nationals with regard to the 
recognition of foreign diplomas, certificates, and formal qualifications. Id. art. 27(3). 
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labor situation.
123
 Subsidiary protection includes the right to social welfare 
and education,
124
 but States may reduce welfare to ―core benefits.‖125 
Subsidiary protection entitles individuals to receive travel documents only 
―when serious humanitarian reasons arise that require their presence in 
another State.‖126  
Many have criticized the hierarchy created by the Qualification 
Directive and the differences in the scope of protection afforded refugees 
and those granted subsidiary protection status. The European Parliament, 
the House of Lords Select Committee, Amnesty International, UNHCR, 
and others argued that the distinctions are arbitrary because they are not 
tied to differences in need, are likely to result in fragmentation of 
international protection, and will probably increase the numbers of appeals 
by those refused refugee status yet granted subsidiary protection.
127
 
Moreover, the assumption that those entitled to subsidiary protection are 
likely to need protection on a more temporary basis than refugees was 
strongly disputed.
128
 The political compromises that produced the 
Qualification Directive, however, resulted in the two-tier approach.
129
  
Other compromises embodied in the Qualification Directive result in 
greater protection for asylum seekers. Member States had strong and 
divergent views about what constitutes persecution and whether asylum 
could be granted based on the actions of non-state actors.
130
 The 
Qualification Directive firmly acknowledges that those persecuted by non-
state actors are entitled to protection, so long as the State or parties 
controlling the State are unable or unwilling to prevent the persecution.
131
 
The Qualification Directive also defines acts of persecution broadly to 
cover acts of physical or mental violence, including sexual violence;
132
 
disproportionate or discriminatory legal, administrative, police, judicial, or 
penal measures;
133
 gender-specific or child-specific acts;
134
 and 
 
 
 123. Id. art. 26(3). 
 124. Id. art. 28(1). 
 125. Id. art. 28(2). 
 126. Id. art. 25(2). 
 127. McAdam, supra note 3, at 498–99. 
 128. Id. at 499. 
 129. See id. at 497–99. 
 130. Germany‘s agreement to the provision recognizing persecution by non-State actors hinged on 
the agreement that subsidiary protection status did not guarantee equivalent rights with refugee status. 
Id. at 497–98. 
 131. Qualification Directive, supra note 113, art. 6. 
 132. Id. art. 9(2)(a). 
 133. Id. art. 9(2)(b)–(d). 
 134. Id. art. 9(2)(f). 
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prosecution for refusing to perform military service in certain 
circumstances.
135
  
In addition, the Qualification Directive takes an expansive view of 
some of the reasons for persecution. Religion, for example, includes: 
―theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or 
abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in 
community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or 
forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any 
religious belief. . . .‖136 
Political opinion includes opinions held, but not acted upon, and 
opinions the persecutor imputes to the applicant.
137
 Nationality includes 
cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity, common geographical origin, as well 
as citizenship or lack of citizenship.
138
 Race includes color, descent, and 
ethnic background.
139
  
With regard to the definition of a particular social group, the 
Qualification Directive adopts a two-part approach: the traditional 
Acosta
140
 formulation and the social perception test. Under this test, 
members of a particular social group are those (1) who share innate traits, 
immutable backgrounds or characteristics so fundamental to identity or 
conscience that they should not be forced to change them, and (2) who 
society perceives as a distinct group.
141
 As the two elements are not 
phrased in the alternative, this may make it more difficult for some victims 
of persecution to qualify as members of a particular social group. The 
Qualification Directive adds that gender alone does not create a particular 
social group, but that gender-related aspects might be relevant to defining 
such a group.
142
 It also specifies that sexual orientation can form the basis 
 
 
 135. Id. art. 9(2)(e). 
 136. Id. art. 10(1)(b). 
 137. Qualification Directive, supra note 112, art. 10(1)(e), 10(2) (imputed opinion). 
 138. Id. art. 10(1)(c). 
 139. Id. art. 10(1)(a). 
 140. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 141. Qualification Directive, supra note 113, art. 10(1)(d). This two-tier approach, adopted by the 
Board of Appeals in Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol24/3617.pdf, is currently a matter of vigorous litigation in the 
United States. In Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009) and Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 
(7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit has rejected adding a social visibility requirement to the particular 
social group analysis. In contrast, the First Circuit held in Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 
2009), that the asylum seekers had the burden of proving the social visibility of the group to which 
they belonged. Other circuits have addressed the issue in non-precedential opinions. See, e.g., 
Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App‘x 956 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per curiam opinion).  
 142. Qualification Directive, supra note 113, art. 10(1)(d). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] EU ASYLUM POLICY 111 
 
 
 
 
of a particular social group, so long as it does not include acts criminalized 
by the national law of the EU Member States.
143
  
E. Asylum Procedures 
The fifth component of the CEAS, the Asylum Procedures Directive, 
took the longest to develop and consensus was difficult to reach.
144
 The 
law setting minimum standards for the procedures used to decide asylum 
claims was finally approved in the last days of 2005, a year and a half after 
the deadline for adoption, with Member States allowed two additional 
years in which to transpose its provisions into national law.
145
 The 
Procedures Directive addresses many different aspects of asylum 
proceedings: basic procedural guarantees,
146
 initial decision-making,
147
 
detention,
148
 border and transit zones,
149
 withdrawal of refugee status,
150
 
and appeal procedures.
151
  
The fundamental guarantees ensure that asylum seekers have access to 
an asylum procedure
152
 and the ability to remain in the Member State 
during the procedure,
153
 the right to be informed of the procedures and the 
resulting decision in a language the asylum seeker can reasonably be 
thought to understand,
154
 the right to consult with the UNHCR,
155
 the right 
to a personal interview,
156
 and the right to an interpreter when submitting 
an asylum claim to the authorities.
157
 Free legal assistance is not mandated, 
but asylum seekers who do not have legal counsel must be informed about 
 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally Panezi, supra note 3; SIDORENKO, supra note 3, at 79–81. 
 145. Council Directive 2005/85, on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for 
Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13 [hereinafter Procedures Directive]. 
The Procedures Directive was adopted on December 1, 2005, entered into force on January 2, 2006, 
and established a transposition deadline of December 1, 2007. 
 146. Id. ch. II, arts. 6–22. 
 147. Id. ch. III, arts. 23–36. 
 148. Id. ch. II, arts. 18–19 (states may not detain individuals for the sole reason that they are 
asylum seekers).  
 149. Id. ch. III, § V. 
 150. Id. ch. IV.  
 151. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, ch. V.  
 152. Id. art. 6. 
 153. Id. art. 7 (right to remain in the Member State during the first-instance proceedings). 
 154. Id. art. 10(1)(a),(e). 
 155. Id. art. 10(1)(c). 
 156. Id. art. 12. States can omit a personal interview in certain circumstances, such as when the 
authorities have already had a meeting with the applicant, id. art. 10(2)(b), or when it is ―not 
reasonably practicable to hold an interview,‖ id. art. 10(3). 
 157. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 10(1)(b). 
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the reason for the decision in their cases and the means available to 
challenge negative decisions.
158
  
The Procedures Directive specifies that asylum seekers cannot be 
detained solely because they apply for asylum.
159
 The Directive is silent as 
to acceptable grounds for detention, though it implicitly acknowledges that 
detention is appropriate in some circumstances.
160
 The Directive explicitly 
requires access to speedy judicial review for detained asylum seekers.
161
 
With regard to appeals in general, asylum applicants have the right to seek 
judicial or administrative review of negative decisions.
162
 However, States 
are not required to stay orders during appeals.
163
  
The Procedures Directive outlines a robust role for the UNHCR. 
Member States must provide UNHCR access to asylum seekers, including 
those in detention, transit areas, at airports, and in other reception 
facilities.
164
 UNHCR must also have access to information concerning 
individual applications, procedures, and decisions, provided the asylum 
seeker consents.
165
 In addition, UNHCR has a right to present its views to 
government authorities on any individual claimant at any stage of the 
proceedings.
166
  
Two of the most contentious points involve expedited procedures and 
the notion of safe countries, concepts familiar to American observers.  
1. Accelerated Procedures 
Many Member States have established accelerated asylum procedures 
at airports and other ports of entry, and the Procedures Directive allows 
special border procedures to continue, so long as certain safeguards 
exist.
167
 Individuals stopped at the border or in transit zones
168
 must be 
 
 
 158. Id. art. 10(1)(e). 
 159. Id. art. 18(1). 
 160. A compilation of EU measures permitting administrative detention of asylum seekers, as well 
as reports and analyses, can be found at European Union, DETENTION IN EUROPE, http://www. 
detention-in-europe.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=92&Itemid=213 (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2011). 
 161. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 18(2). 
 162. Id. art. 39(1) (listing decisions that can be appealed).  
 163. Id. art. 39(3).  
 164. Id. art. 21(1)(a). 
 165. Id. art. 21(1)(b). 
 166. Id. art. 21(1)(c). 
 167. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 35(2) (Member States may continue to use special 
border procedures already in effect when the Procedures Directive was adopted, so long as they meet 
certain prerequisites).  
 168. Id. art. 35(5) (Member States may utilize the specialized border procedures elsewhere, such 
as in facilities located near borders or transit zones, when there is an overflow of applicants at the 
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immediately informed of their rights and obligations; supplied an 
interpreter if necessary; allowed to consult with legal counsel; and 
provided an interview with an official trained in asylum and refugee 
law.
169
 Asylum claimants must be guaranteed the right to remain in the 
border or transit zone while their requests are processed
170
 and the right to 
appeal a negative decision.
171
 If a decision is not made within four weeks, 
asylum applicants must be allowed to enter the country to submit their 
applications via the normal asylum procedure.
172
  
In addition to special border procedures, the Procedures Directive 
permits Member States to establish expedited proceedings within their 
territory in a variety of circumstances. The Procedures Directive lists 
fifteen situations in which Member States can resort to accelerated 
procedures.
173
 This list is not only long, but the circumstances that can 
justify accelerated procedures are extremely broad. For example, Member 
States may accelerate proceedings for applications that ―clearly‖ do not 
satisfy the refugee criteria,
174
 applications containing ―inconsistent, 
contradictory, improbable or insufficient representations that [make the] 
claim[s] clearly unconvincing,‖175 applications filed late without 
reasonable cause,
176
 applications that mislead the authorities by 
withholding relevant information concerning identity and nationality,
177
 
applications that include false information or fraudulent documents,
178
 
applications from individuals who entered unlawfully and did not file an 
asylum application as soon as possible,
179
 and applications deemed 
unfounded because the asylum seekers come from a safe country of origin 
or a safe third country.
180
 In each of these circumstances, the Member 
States can adopt short deadlines for preparing cases and filing appeals. 
Short deadlines make it hard to locate legal assistance and undercut the 
ability to prepare a thorough case; indeed, they increase the likelihood of 
negative results.  
 
 
border or ―in the event of particular types of arrivals . . . which makes it practically impossible‖ to 
process the claims at the borders or in transit zones.).  
 169. Id. art. 35(3). 
 170. Id. art. 35(3)(a). 
 171. Id. art. 39(1)(a)(ii). 
 172. Id. art. 35(4). 
 173. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 23(4). 
 174. Id. art. 23(4)(g). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. art. 23(4)(i). 
 177. Id. art. 23(4)(d). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 23(4)(l). 
 180. Id. art. 23(4)(c). See infra notes 196–212 for a discussion of safe country concepts. 
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The difficulties of short deadlines and accelerated procedures are 
familiar to asylum seekers, advocates, and scholars in the United States. In 
1996, the U.S. Congress enacted expedited removal procedures,
181
 which 
authorize border control officials to turn away those who arrive without 
proper documents
182
 or with fraudulent documents without an opportunity 
for hearing or appellate review.
183
 Those who state that they fear 
persecution or want to apply for asylum must be allowed to remain 
temporarily in order to be interviewed by an asylum officer.
184
 The asylum 
officer assesses whether the individual has a ―credible fear of 
persecution,‖ an easier standard to satisfy than the ―well-founded fear‖ 
required for eligibility for asylum.
185
 Those found to have a credible fear 
of persecution are scheduled for a full hearing on the merits of their 
asylum claim.
186
 Those determined not to have a credible fear may seek 
review in a special procedure before an immigration judge.
187
 The 
immigration judge must complete this expedited review within seven days, 
and the asylum seeker remains detained throughout the accelerated 
proceeding.
188
  
 
 
 181. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 422, 110 
Stat. 1213 (1996) (AEDPA) adopted expedited removal procedures which were promptly revised by 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 302(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (IIRIRA), and are now found in INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1) (2008). Expedited removal procedures generally apply at the border. They also apply in 
the interior of the United States in two instances: (1) noncitizens who entered without inspection and 
are stopped within 100 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border or the U.S.-Canada border, unless they can 
show they have been present in the United States more than fourteen days, Designating Aliens for 
Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. 11, 2004); and (2) noncitizens who entered by sea, 
evaded inspection, and have been present in the United States, unless they can show they have been 
present in the United States more than two years, Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited 
Removal Under Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924 
(2002). INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii). See generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, 
HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 685–86 (6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter AMMF].  
 182. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) refers to INA § 212(a)(7), which states that noncitizens who lack valid 
travel documents cannot be admitted to the United States. 
 183. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i) refers to INA § 212(a)(6)(C), which states that noncitizens who have 
fraudulently or willfully misrepresented facts in seeking or procuring travel documents are not 
admissible to the United States.  
 184. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii); INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(i).  
 185. The statute defines a credible fear of persecution to include ―a significant possibility, taking 
into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien‘s claim and such 
other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum under [U.S. 
legislation.]‖ INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v). 
 186. Id. § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii).  
 187. Id. § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).  
 188. Id. § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III)–(IV).  
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As in Europe, many have criticized the short deadlines and truncated 
proceedings, emphasizing the difficulties of ensuring accurate 
determinations and evenhanded application of the law when there is little 
time to prepare an effective application much less to obtain legal 
assistance.
189
 A 2005 report by a bipartisan commission muted some of the 
criticism. The commission found that asylum officers determined that a 
credible fear existed in more than 90% of the proceedings and decided the 
fear was not credible in only 1% of the cases.
190
 These results surprised 
many observers and provided reassurance that individuals who fear 
persecution will receive a hearing on the merits of their claim.  
An earlier point in the procedure has been the focus of new concerns, 
however. The report indicated that a significant number, perhaps as high 
as 15%, of those who told the border guards that they feared returning to 
their homelands were not provided a credible fear hearing.
191
 This gap is 
worrisome, and it compounds concerns that accelerated procedures furnish 
asylum seekers with too little time to prepare their cases and too little 
opportunity to seek review of erroneous decisions. Nonetheless, the 
American experience with expedited removal during the past decade may 
provide guidance in amending the current EU Procedures Directive to add 
additional safeguards, such as adopting a ―credible fear‖ standard in 
preliminary screening of asylum seekers facing accelerated procedures at 
the border.  
More drastic than the Procedures Directive‘s imprimatur on expedited 
proceedings is the Directive‘s perspective on inadmissible claims. Claims 
deemed inadmissible can be refused without any examination—not even 
an expedited one—of the merits.192 The Procedures Directive specifies 
seven types of asylum applications that can be rejected as inadmissible. 
Some of the grounds are likely to have wide support: claims by individuals 
 
 
 189. For critical analyses, see generally Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Removal Study Report 
on the First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL‘Y 1 (2001); Philip Schrag & Michelle Pistone, The New Asylum Rule: Not Yet a Model of 
Fair Procedure, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 267 (1997); Juan Osuna & Patricia Mariani, Expedited 
Removal: Authorities, Implementation, and Ongoing Policy and Practice Issues, 97–11 IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS 1 (1997). 
 190. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (CIRF), established by the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787 (1998), issued its 
Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal in February of 2005. U.S. COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2005) 
[hereinafter CIRF REPORT]. The report indicated that the asylum officers determined that a credible 
fear of persecution existed in more than 90% of the cases, rejected 1% of the cases, and resolved the 
case in some other way in the remaining instances. AMMF, supra note 181, at 682. 
 191. CIRF REPORT, supra note 190, at 54; AMMF, supra note 181, at 681. 
 192. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 25 (inadmissibility grounds).  
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previously granted refugee status in a Member State
193
 and applications 
filed by individuals who already have the right to remain in a Member 
State with protections equivalent to refugee status.
194
 Other grounds have 
released torrents of criticism, particularly the provision that deems 
inadmissible applications filed by asylum seekers the authorities believe 
have a safe country to which they can go.
195
 It is to this concept that I now 
turn. 
2. Safe Countries 
Different versions of the ―safe country‖ concept appear in the 
Procedures Directive.
196 A ―safe country of origin‖ refers to the asylum 
seeker‘s homeland and the view that the asylum seeker is unlikely to face 
serious threats of persecution or other harm at home that would warrant 
international protection.
197
 A ―safe country of asylum‖ or a ―country of 
first asylum‖ refers to a country, other than the homeland, in which the 
asylum seeker has already received protection.
198
 A ―safe third country‖ is 
 
 
 193. Id. art. 25(2)(a). 
 194. Id. art. 25(2)(d). In addition, applications identical to claims already rejected by a final 
decision are inadmissible. Id. art. 25(2)(f). 
 195. Id. art. 25(2)(b)–(c).  
 196. In general, the idea of a ―safe country‖ in asylum law relates to a country which is ―thought 
to be ‗safe‘ in some generic sense‖ as determined by the norms and standards of a particular asylum 
regime. Legomsky, supra note 94, at 575. In practice, a determination that a particular country is safe 
will amount to restrictions in the asylum process for the individual seeking protection. For example, if 
a refugee is seeking asylum in country X and the laws and regulations in that jurisdiction have a 
procedural mechanism for determining that there is another safe country, the asylum adjudicator might 
be instructed to restrict such a person from having his or her claim assessed in country X. The concept 
of which countries are safe may be ―announced unilaterally by the destination country, or it might be 
part of a readmission agreement or an agreement to allocate responsibility for deciding asylum 
claims.‖ Id. Although the safe country concept was historically most popular in Western Europe, it has 
proliferated to other regions, including 1996 reforms to asylum law in the United States. Id. at 575–76. 
Advocates of the concept explain that it serves various purposes based in administrative efficiency, 
such as the avoidance of forum shopping, harmonization and regional solutions to forced migration, 
and burden sharing among various countries. See Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shacknove, The Safe 
Country Notion in Asylum European Law, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 208–15 (1996). Despite these 
justifications, the concept has generated significant controversy. One of the most common criticisms is 
that ―safe country‖ is simply a procedural device that results in avoiding ―consideration of the actual 
merits of the asylum seeker‘s case.‖ John-Hopkins, supra note 3, at 220.  
 197. The Procedures Directive contains three alternative approaches to designating safe countries 
of origin. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, arts. 29–31. Creation of a common list of safe 
countries generated substantial controversy and led to litigation. In 2008, the ECJ annulled arts. 29(1) 
and (2) and 36(3) regarding the procedures for creating a common list of safe countries. Case C-
133106, Parliament v. Council, 2008 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2429 (May 6, 2008). For a general 
explanation and critique of the ―safe country of origin‖ concept, see Byrne & Shacknove, supra note 
196. 
 198. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 26 (first country of asylum).  
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a country other than the homeland and the Member State reviewing the 
application for asylum.
199
 The asylum applicant may or may not have 
already been in the third country; whether this third country will accept the 
asylum seeker and afford him or her safety are often hotly contested 
points.  
All of the safe country variations appear in the Procedures Directive, 
but the safe third country concept generates the greatest concern. The safe 
third country concept is very expansive; an individual typically has only 
one country of origin and one country in which an asylum application has 
been filed, but the asylum seeker may have passed through or had prior 
dealings with many ―third‖ countries. As a consequence, the role of the 
safe third country concept in the Procedures Directive warrants special 
attention.  
Under the Procedures Directive, the Member States can shunt an 
asylum applicant into accelerated proceedings based on the notion that the 
application is unfounded because there is a safe country to which the 
applicant can go.
200
 Even more drastically, Member States can declare a 
case inadmissible and refuse to examine it at all.
201
 These measures create 
major risks for asylum seekers. When a Member State sends an asylum 
seeker to a third state for adjudication of the claim, the third state might 
fail to examine the merits of the claim. The third state could ship the 
asylum seeker to a ―fourth‖ country that allegedly has responsibility to 
decide the request for asylum.
202
 Alternatively, the third state might review 
the claim, but examine the application pursuant to inadequate asylum 
procedures.
203
 Or the third state might be poor, unstable, and unable to 
provide adequate protection.  
In recognition of these potential harms, the Procedures Directive limits 
the countries that can be viewed as ―safe.‖ The country must be free from 
threats to the asylum seeker‘s life or liberty on account of race, religion, 
 
 
 199. Id. art. 27 (safe third country). 
 200. Id. art. 23(4)(c). See supra note 180 and accompanying text.  
 201. Id. art. 25. See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.  
 202. Attempts to allocate responsibility of asylum claims amongst various countries can result in a 
problem defined as ―orbits and chains,‖ whereby the asylum seeker will ―be subjected either to a 
sequence of cumulatively lengthy involuntary exiles to various other countries before his or her 
refugee status claim is eventually determined or, worse, to indirect chain refoulement to the country of 
origin.‖ Legomsky, supra note 94, at 583–88.  
 203. The safe third country principle can have devastating consequences in the realm of human 
rights. As a refugee is referred from one country to another, the possibility of facing human rights 
violations, such as greater procedural deficiencies, increases. See Byrne & Shacknove, supra note 196, 
at 219–27 (1996); Legomsky, supra note 94, at 583–88. 
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nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group.
204
 The 
asylum applicant must have the possibility to seek refugee status in the 
third country.
205
 The third country must live up to the non-refoulement 
obligations imposed by the 1951 Refugee Convention
206
 as well as the 
international law prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.
207
  
In addition, a Member State can only send an asylum seeker to a safe 
third country if the Member State has national legislation containing rules 
requiring a reasonable connection between the applicant and the 
destination third country.
208
 Individual asylum seekers must be able to 
challenge the decision that the third country is safe.
209
 Asylum applicants 
whose applications are ruled inadmissible on safe third country grounds 
must have the right to seek judicial or administrative review.
210
 
To lessen the chances of chain refoulement, with successive third 
countries diverting asylum seekers to yet another country, the Procedures 
Directive requires the Member State to furnish the asylum seeker with a 
notice in the language of the third country that explains that the merits of 
the asylum claim have not been reviewed.
211
 If the third country does not 
admit the asylum seeker to its territory, the Member State must accept the 
asylum seeker back and decide the asylum claim.
212
 The Directive does 
not, however, require the Member State to secure in advance the third 
country‘s agreement to accept the asylum seeker and adjudicate the claim. 
As the Procedures Directive is the most recently enacted element of the 
CEAS, experience concerning the safe third country provision is sparse. 
 
 
 204. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 27(1)(a). 
 205. Id. art. 27(1)(d). 
 206. Id. art. 27(1)(b) (express reference to the Geneva Convention, as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, is popularly known; article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits returning 
refugees to territories where their lives or freedom are threatened). 
 207. Id. art. 27(1)(c) (express reference to international law prohibitions of torture, cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment). Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 112, and the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, both 
prohibit returning individuals to states where they will face torture or inhuman and degrading 
treatment. This non-refoulement obligation is also considered a principle of customary international 
law. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345–54 (3d 
ed. 2007). 
 208. Procedures Directive, supra note 145, art. 27(2)(a). 
 209. Id. art. 27(2)(c) (third county, at a minimum, must not expose the asylum seeker to risks of 
torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).  
 210. Id. art. 39(1)(a)(i). 
 211. Id. art. 27(3)(b). 
 212. Id. art. 27(4). 
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The lack of empirical data is compounded by the notorious difficulty in 
ascertaining what happens to asylum seekers after they have been 
transferred to airports in distant lands. Prior to the enactment of the 
Procedures Directive, the few studies that attempted to track asylum 
seekers refused admission on safe third country grounds in European 
Union countries indicated that chain refoulement was a serious problem.
213
 
This provision of the Procedures Directive bears close watching.  
It is noteworthy for an American audience that U.S. law contains an 
analogous safe third country provision. The statute precludes asylum 
applications from asylum seekers who can be removed ―pursuant to a 
bilateral or multilateral agreement‖ to a country where they have access to 
a full and fair asylum procedure and where they will not face threats to 
their lives or freedom.
214
 To date, Canada is the only country that falls 
within this provision. After years of negotiations, the United States and 
Canada entered into a formal agreement providing that asylum claims filed 
at land entries will be adjudicated by the nation in which the applicant was 
physically present immediately before filing for asylum.
215
 Those traveling 
to Canada from the United States and filing applications in Canada will 
have their claims decided by the United States, and vice versa.
216
 The 
agreement provides that neither Canada nor the United States can deflect 
the responsibility to evaluate the asylum application by sending the 
asylum seeker to a different country.
217
 From the U.S. perspective, at this 
point the only safe third country is Canada.
218
  
 
 
 213. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, ―SAFE THIRD COUNTRIES‖: 
MYTHS AND REALITIES (1995), available at http://www.ecre.org/resources/policy_papers/227; 
STEVEN EDMINSTER, AT FORTRESS EUROPE‘S MOAT: THE ―SAFE THIRD COUNTRY CONCEPT‖ (1997).  
 214. INA § 208(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A)). 
 215. Joint Memorandum between Canada and the United States [hereinafter United States-Canada 
Safe Third Country Agreement], 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1431 (2002), implementing regulations 
found at 69 Fed. Reg. 69, 479 (2004). Negotiations to craft a bilateral agreement acceptable to both 
Canada and the United States took years and agreement occurred in late 2002. It applies to those who 
apply for asylum at land ports of entry.  
 216. United States-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 215, art. 4.  
 217. Id. art. 3.  
 218. In 2007, the Federal Court of Canada concluded that the United States-Canada Safe Third 
Country Agreement violated the 1951 Refugee Convention and Canadian law. Canadian Council for 
Refugees v. Respondent, [2007] F.C. 1262 (Can.). The Court of Appeals of Canada reversed the 
Federal Court. Canadian Council for Refugees v. Respondent, 2008 Carswell Nat. 1995 (Can. F.C.A.). 
The Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear an appeal. Canadian Council for Refugees v. 
Respondent, Canada Supreme Court, 2009 Carswell Nat. 5170 (Can. S.C.). The UNHCR monitors the 
operation of the agreement and its legality under standards of international law. A review of the first 
year of the operation of the agreement found that the total number of U.S. asylum applicants subject to 
the agreement was sixty-two. UNHCR, UNHCR MONITORING REPORT: CANADA-UNITED STATES 
―SAFE THIRD COUNTRY‖ AGREEMENT, 29 December 2004–28 December 2005, at 112 (2006). A 
recent UNHCR Country Operation Plan for Canada indicated: ―[i]n ―monitoring the Agreement, 
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F. Other Measures 
In addition to the five major legislative acts that comprise the CEAS, 
the European Union has created several new entities. European 
Dactyloscopy (―EURODAC‖), a central database for comparing 
fingerprints of asylum seekers and other third-country nationals, as 
noncitizens of EU Member States are called, is now in place.
219
 Frontex, a 
new agency to coordinate external border enforcement and management, 
has come into existence.
220
 In 2006 and 2007 Frontex mounted Operation 
Hera
221
 to intercept boats with migrants headed toward the Canary Islands 
and Operation Nautilus
222
 to intercept migrants in the Mediterranean 
heading to Malta and Italy. In addition, the EU has promulgated multiple 
migration measures that may substantially deter asylum seekers. For 
example, the EU has adopted a common visa policy
223
 and has adopted 
laws placing duties, enforced by monetary fines, on public carrier 
companies that bring unauthorized passengers to the EU.
224
  
 
 
UNHCR‘s findings were that it has been implemented according to the terms of the agreement and 
international refugee law.‖ UNHCR, UNHCR COUNTRY OPERATIONS PLAN: CANADA, 2008–2009 
(2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4706097f2.html.  
 219. The first law, Council Regulation (EC) No. 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 Concerning the 
Establishment of ‗Eurodac‘ for the Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective Application of the 
Dublin Convention, 2000 O.J. (L 316), was followed two years later by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
407/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 62) prescribing implementation rules.  
 220. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 Establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L 349) 1.  
 221. Frontex carried out Operation Hera with two primary activities. First, experts from various 
Member States were deployed to support Spanish authorities on the Canary Islands in their efforts to 
interview migrants and obtain information regarding their countries of origin and other knowledge 
relevant to the flow of migration. Second, joint sea patrols were put in place along the coast of West 
Africa, involving Member States and third countries who have agreements with Spain to participate in 
such patrols. Hera I (July 17, 2006–Oct. 31, 2006) involved expert deployment, Hera II (Aug. 11, 
2006–Dec. 15, 2006) focused on joint surveillance and patrol, and Hera III (Feb. 12, 2007–Apr. 12, 
2007) involved both expert deployment and patrol. See Examples of Accomplished Operations: 
Canary Islands—Hera, OFFICIAL SITE OF FRONTEX, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_ 
accomplished_operati/art5.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
 222. Operation Nautilus entailed a joint sea operation with the objective of stemming the 
migration flow in the Central Mediterranean, targeting Malta and Italy. Five Member States 
participated in the operation which took place from October 5–15, 2006. See Examples of 
Accomplished Operations: Central Mediterranean-Nautilus, OFFICIAL SITE OF FRONTEX, http://www. 
frontex.europa.eu/examples_of_accomplished_operati/art6.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).  
 223. Council Regulation 539/2001, amended by Council Regulation 851/2005, lists countries 
whose nationals must have a visa to enter the Schengen area and the countries for which the visa 
requirement is waived. For further details regarding the common visa policy, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_visa_en.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2011) and 
corresponding legislation.  
 224. Council Directive 2004/82 on the Obligation of Carriers to Communicate Passenger Data, 
2004 O.J. (L 261) 24 (EC).  
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III. ASYLUM FOR VICTIMS OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE  
For many years war refugees have faced major obstacles in obtaining 
asylum. The centerpiece of international refugee law, the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, privileges those uprooted due to persecution based on race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group.
225
 Many who flee civil wars or insurrections can convincingly 
demonstrate that they are likely to risk persecution if they return to their 
country of origin. Others, though possessing evidence that their lives 
might be in serious danger if sent back to a homeland consumed by armed 
conflict, lack proof that they will be persecuted.  
In the post-World War II era, government authorities have typically 
linked asylum to refugee status, which is available only to those with well-
founded fears of persecution. For those fleeing war zones, governments 
have crafted different temporary arrangements, known variously as 
―humanitarian asylum,‖ ―temporary protection,‖ ―exceptional leave to 
remain,‖ ―tolerated status,‖ war refugees, and de facto refugees.226 These 
ad hoc programs frequently are country-specific, based on government 
assessments of the levels of violence in the asylum seekers‘ homelands.227 
Administrative discretion has been the hallmark of these measures. 
Governments weigh pragmatic considerations—the numbers displaced by 
warfare around the world, the magnet effect of asylum and resettlement, 
the domestic implications of receiving refugees—against humanitarian 
impulses. The result has been a patchwork of legal arrangements; 
flexibility has trumped coherence.  
A. Subsidiary Protection in the European Union 
Prior to the development of a common asylum law for the European 
Union, all Member States extended some form of protection to refugees 
from war-torn zones.
228
 Indeed, some Member States granted protection 
pursuant to ad hoc measures much more frequently than they granted 
 
 
 225. By its terms, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not require that parties grant asylum to 
refugees, but many legislatures have used this definition as the criterion for granting individuals 
asylum. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 207, at 46. 
 226. See, e.g., JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 21–24 (1991). 
 227. For example, Germany prohibited the deportation of Croats during the early 1990s while war 
was raging in Croatia but lifted the ban and provided for phased repatriation once the armed hostilities 
ended. Kay Hailbronner, Temporary and Local Responses to Forced Migration: A Comment, 35 VA. J. 
INT‘L. L. 81, 88–89 (1994). 
 228. McAdam, supra note 3, at 463–64. 
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refugee status.
229
 Against this backdrop, the European Council directed 
that the CEAS include both refugee status and additional ―measures on 
subsidiary forms of protection offering an appropriate status to any person 
in need of such protection.‖230 The Qualification Directive took up the 
challenge. It requires Member States to grant legal status to those non-EU 
citizens who satisfy the subsidiary protection definition:  
A third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify 
as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or 
her country of origin . . . would face a real risk of suffering serious 
harm as defined in Article 15 . . . .
231
  
The meaning of ―serious harm‖ is the crux of the definition, and article 
15 of the Qualification Directive sets forth three circumstances that 
constitute serious harm: 
(a) death penalty or execution; or  
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an 
applicant in the country of origin; or  
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian‘s life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
internal armed conflict.
 232
 
The first two provisions reiterate legal obligations already ensconced in 
European law.
233
 Article 15(a) refers to the death penalty, which all 
Member States prohibit under current law.
234
 In addition, the jurisprudence 
 
 
 229. Id. at 464.  
 230. Tampere Conclusions, supra note 28, ¶ 14. 
 231. Qualification Directive, supra note 113, art. 2(e). Article 18 specifies ―Member States shall 
grant subsidiary protection status to a third country national or a stateless person eligible for subsidiary 
protection in accordance with [this Directive].‖ Id. art. 18. 
 232. Id. art. 15.  
 233. As described below, these legal obligations stem from the European Human Rights 
Convention, not from the EU. See infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text. All EU Member States 
are parties to the ECHR, which is interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, not by the 
European Court of Justice. 
 234. As all Member States are parties to the ECHR, supra note 207, they are bound by Protocol 6 
of this Convention which prohibits the death penalty in peacetime, and Protocol 13, which prohibits 
the death penalty in all circumstances. In addition, all Member States are parties to the Second 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which also outlaws the 
death penalty. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (as of Jan. 2009), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-12&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
Furthermore, when the Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 18, came into force on Dec. 1, 2009, and 
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of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits extradition to 
states that will impose the death penalty.
235
 Article 15(b) is virtually 
identical to article 3 of the European Human Rights Convention, to which 
all EU Member States are parties.
236
 Accordingly, even prior to the 
Qualification Directive the law prohibited Member States from returning 
individuals to countries where they would face torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment. For individuals who satisfy article 15(a) or (b), the 
Qualification Directive brings only a small improvement by mandating a 
legal status rather than merely forbidding refoulement. 
Article 15(c), in contrast, constitutes a major change in the scope of 
protection. It brings threats from indiscriminate violence within the ambit 
of ―serious harm.‖ Prior to the Qualification Directive, no European treaty 
or legislation prohibited refoulement of victims of indiscriminate violence 
or required Member States to grant them legal status. Thus, article 15(c) 
expands the right of asylum in the EU to civilians facing serious and 
individual threats from armed conflict. The ECJ‘s first encounter with the 
new European asylum law considered which civilians belong in the newly 
protected group of war refugees. 
B. Individual Threat and Indiscriminate Violence  
The Elgafajis arrived in the Netherlands in 2006, two years after the 
adoption of the Qualification Directive.
237
 They had left a country 
experiencing military invasion and sectarian violence. Mr. Elgafaji, a 
Shiite Muslim, and his wife, a Sunni Muslim, lived in Baghdad where 
forced evictions, physical assaults, and murder were used to create wholly 
Shiite and wholly Sunni neighborhoods.
238
 Political violence threatened 
 
 
incorporated the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU law, it expressly prohibited the death penalty. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 2, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.  
 235. The Soering decision by the European Court of Human Rights prohibited extradition to states 
in which the accused would suffer the ―death row phenomenon.‖ Soering v. UK, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(Ser. A) (1989). In addition, the European Convention on Extradition, art. 11, E.T.S. No. 24, bans the 
extradition of an individual to a state where the death penalty will be imposed and/or requires written 
assurance from the receiving country that the death penalty will not be pursued.  
 236. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra 
note 207, art. 3, states: ―No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.‖ This text has been adopted verbatim by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, supra note 234, art. 4, which entered into force Dec. 1, 2009.  
 237. Article 39 of the Qualification Directive provided that it would enter into force on the 
twentieth day following publication in the Official Journal, which was Sept. 30, 2004. Article 38 
provided that the Member States shall transpose the Directive‘s standards into national law by October 
10, 2006. The Dutch Minister for Immigration and Integration rejected the application for temporary 
residence permits on December 20, 2006. Elgafaji, supra note 2, ¶ 19. 
 238. Sabrina Tavernese, Quiet Killings Split Neighborhood Where Sunnis and Shiites Once Lived 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
124 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:87 
 
 
 
 
many, whether they were bystanders or, like Mr. Elgafaji, employees of 
companies providing support to the coalition forces.
239
  
The Dutch authorities rejected the Elgafajis‘ claim on the ground that 
they had not established a real risk of serious and individual threat in their 
home country.
240
 The Elgafajis then challenged the government‘s decision 
in the District Court in The Hague. The court concluded that applications 
for protection filed pursuant to article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive 
do not require a ―high degree of individualization‖ of threats and annulled 
the order denying residence permits to the Elgafajis.
241
 The government 
appealed the District Court‘s ruling to the Dutch Council of State, the 
highest court in the Netherlands in matters challenging government action.  
The parties emphasized different portions of the text of article 15(c) in 
analyzing whether the Elgafajis had demonstrated the ―serious harm‖ 
required for subsidiary protection. The Dutch government focused on the 
language specifying an individual threat by reason of indiscriminate 
violence. The government contended that this language requires evidence 
that applicants for subsidiary protection have been specifically targeted, 
and unless singled out, victims of indiscriminate violence are not entitled 
to subsidiary protection.
242
  
The Dutch drew support for their interpretation of article 15(c) from 
the other provisions in article 15, arguing that article 15(a)‘s reference to 
death penalty or execution implies a punishment imposed on a particular 
individual. They emphasized article 15(b)‘s incorporation of the language 
of article 3 of the European Human Rights Convention, which has been 
limited to circumstances in which an individual has been singled out or 
targeted.
243
 Accordingly, they argued that article 15(c) should be 
understood to require such individualized threats.  
 
 
Side by Side, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at A7; Sabrina Tavernese, Sects’ Strife Takes a Toll on 
Baghdad’s Daily Bread, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2006, at A1. 
 239. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶ 18. 
 240. Id. ¶ 19.  
 241. Id. ¶¶ 21–23. The Rechtbank te‗s-Gravenhage is the trial court for the district of the Hague. It 
is one of nineteen trial courts (rechtbanken) in the Netherlands. The Staatssecretaris van Justitie, the 
respondent in the case, is the ―Under-Minister of Justice,‖ a role comparable to that of Deputy 
Attorney General in the U.S. system. See generally OFFICIAL SITE OF THE DUTCH JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
(English version), http://www.rechtspraak.nl/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).  
 242. Elgafaji,2009 E.C.R. I-00921. 
 243. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 207, art. 3, states: ―No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.‖ Note the similarity to the Qualification Directive, supra note 113, art. 15(b): 
―[Serious harm consists of] torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in 
the country of origin.‖  
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The Elgafaji family asserted that the Dutch interpretation of article 
15(c) was too narrow. They contended that they themselves were 
individually threatened by the indiscriminate violence in Iraq. The 
Elgafajis also declared that the structure of article 15 supported their 
interpretation: article 15(c) would be redundant if interpreted to reach only 
the circumstances covered by 15(a) and (b).  
The Council of State decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the 
matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. No other appellate court had yet 
interpreted eligibility for subsidiary protection under the terms of article 
15(c). The terms of article 15(c) were susceptible to different 
interpretations, and the practical impact of the interpretation could be 
enormous. The ECJ would be the first to address the scope of the new 
subsidiary protection status.
244
  
1. The Reference to the European Court of Justice 
Understanding the procedural posture of the litigation is critical to 
assessing the significance of the ECJ‘s Judgment of February 17, 2009. 
The principles of EU law require the courts of Member States to interpret 
and rely on EU legislation when it is applicable.
245
 If the courts of Member 
States are unsure about the applicability or the meaning of an EU legal 
provision, they can temporarily halt the litigation before them while they 
seek clarification of the disputed provision from the ECJ.
246
 This approach 
is known as a reference for a preliminary ruling. 
References for a preliminary ruling are somewhat akin to the 
certification procedure in the United States that allows federal courts faced 
with difficult state law questions to seek a definitive interpretation from 
 
 
 244. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶¶ 25–26.  
 245. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1, established that EU law has direct effect in 
Member States and can be enforced in the Member States‘ courts. 
 246. EEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 177, provides: 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the 
interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the 
Community and of the ECB; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an 
act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. 
 Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court 
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
  Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that 
court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 
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the highest court of the state.
247
 References for preliminary rulings allow 
the ECJ to provide authoritative interpretations of EU law, after which the 
Member State‘s judiciary can then apply the correct interpretation of EU 
law in the ongoing litigation in the Member State.  
In the Elgafaji case, the Dutch Council of State sought a preliminary 
ruling from the ECJ on two specific questions: 
(1) Is the protection offered by Article 15(c) congruent with that 
offered by Article 3 of the European Human Rights Convention, 
which requires a showing that the applicant has been specifically 
targeted?  
(2) If Article 15(c) provides broader protection than Article 3, what 
are the criteria that determine eligibility under Article 15(c)?
248
  
A common law lawyer will immediately note several points about the 
Elgafaji preliminary ruling procedure. The Dutch Council of State posed 
two abstract legal questions, and it avoided framing the statutory 
interpretation issue in terms of the facts of the underlying litigation. 
Indeed, the questions did not even mention the facts. This emphasizes the 
abstract ruling that the preliminary ruling procedure envisions. The 
national court poses a question. The ECJ considers the question and 
provides its interpretation of the law, but it does not attempt to apply this 
interpretation of the law to the specific facts involved in the case. 
Applying the law to the facts is left to the national court.  
Further, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ responds only 
to the questions posed by the referring court. The ECJ does not address 
other potential grounds for resolving the particular dispute. This can seem 
 
 
 247. In certain circumstances where a particular issue of state law could be best resolved by a state 
court, federal courts can take advantage of the certification process. In such a situation, the federal 
court retains jurisdiction over all federal and state claims that may be involved, but has discretion to 
submit a novel question of state law to the appropriate jurisdiction. Most state statutes have provisions 
which allow for certification and describe the process by which federal courts can refer a question to 
the highest court in the state. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE Vol. 17A, § 4248 (3d ed. 2007). 
 248. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶ 26 reprints the two questions:  
1. Is Article 15(c) of [the Directive] to be interpreted as offering protection only in a situation 
in which Article 3 of the [ECHR], as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, also has a bearing, or does Article 15(c), in comparison with Article 3 of the 
[ECHR], offer supplementary or other protection? 
2. If Article 15(c) of the Directive, in comparison with Article 3 of the [ECHR], offers 
supplementary or other protection, what are the criteria in that case for determining whether a 
person who claims to be eligible for subsidiary protection status runs a real risk of serious and 
individual threat by reason of indiscriminate violence within the terms of Article 15(c) of the 
Directive, read in conjunction with Article 2(e) thereof? 
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distracting and even inefficient to those trained in the common law 
system. The Elgafaji case, for example, contained facts—a death threat 
posted on the door—that appear to meet a specifically targeted standard,249 
but the question posed by the Dutch Council of State was whether article 
15(c) always requires evidence that the applicant has been specifically 
targeted.
250
 
2. The Judgment of February 17, 2009 
At first reading, the ECJ judgment appears to constitute a robust 
endorsement of the position advanced by the applicants for subsidiary 
protection. The ECJ adopted textual and structural analyses of article 15(c) 
that favored the Elgafajis, and the court adopted a critical tone, chastising 
the Dutch Council of State for confusing the European Human Rights 
Convention with the Qualification Directive. The court also sternly 
reminded the Dutch authorities of their obligation to interpret national law 
in light of EU law, even if the transposition of the EU Directive into Dutch 
law had not occurred until after the Elgafajis filed their claims for 
subsidiary protection.
251
   
Closer attention to the judgment and its reasoning, though, reveals that 
the court offers a tempered interpretation of article 15(c). The ECJ began 
its analysis by rejecting the Dutch Council of State‘s formulation of the 
preliminary ruling questions in the context of article 3 of the European 
Human Rights Convention.
252
 Emphasizing that the Qualification 
Directive stems from EU law, an independent source of law, the ECJ 
refused to limit the scope of EU subsidiary protection to that outlined in 
the European Human Rights Convention.
253
 The court then examined the 
 
 
 249. A note fixed to one‘s door threatening ―Death to Collaborators‖ would appear to constitute 
evidence of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion, thus meeting the 
qualification for refugee status under the Qualification Directive, art. 2(c), and under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. It would also appear to satisfy the ―specifically targeted‖ threat requirement imposed by 
the jurisprudence interpreting ECHR, supra note 207, art. 3 and accompanying text. 
 250. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶ 26(1). The Council of State also posed a second question: if 
evidence of individual targeting is not required, what evidence is relevant to assessing whether the 
applicant for subsidiary protection runs a real risk of serious and individual threat? Id. ¶ 26(2). 
 251. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶¶ 41–42. 
 252. Id. ¶ 28. 
 253. The ECJ stressed that, although the fundamental human rights framework established by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom undergirds EU 
law, the substantive provisions of EU law have independent content. Id. ¶ 28. Ten months after the 
Elgafaji decision, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, incorporating into EU law a Charter of 
Fundamental Freedoms that includes many provisions similar or identical to the terms of the ECHR, 
supra notes 18, 234, 236.  
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structure of article 15 of the Qualification Directive in order to give 
content to the term ―serious harm.‖ It deduced from the three alternative 
formulations of serious harm that each sub-section must cover different 
types of injury,
254
 and accordingly, it concluded that article 15(c) should 
address matters not encompassed by article 15(a)–(b).255 As article 15(b) 
mirrors the protection available under European human rights law, the ECJ 
concluded that article 15(c) should be interpreted to address situations 
other than those that would fall within the European Human Rights 
Convention‘s ban on torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
specifically targeting an individual.
256
  
The court next turned to the text of article 15(c): ―[s]erious harm 
consists of serious and individual threat to a civilian‘s life or person by 
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal 
armed conflict.‖257 Focusing first on the type of harm contemplated in 
article 15(c), the court contrasted article 15(c)‘s reference to a ―threat to 
. . . life or person‖ with article 15(a)‘s reference to death penalty or 
execution, and article 15(b)‘s reference to torture, inhuman treatment or 
punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment. In the court‘s view, 
all of the harms enumerated in articles 15(a) and 15(b)—execution, 
torture, inhuman treatment—embody a specific type of harm that a 
particular individual faces,
258
 whereas the broader ―threat to life or person‖ 
encompasses many unspecified forms of violence and harm.
259
 As a 
consequence, the court concluded that article 15(c) covers a more general 
risk of harm than the other subsections.
260
 Moreover, the court found 
support for reading article 15(c) broadly from its references to armed 
conflict and threats of indiscriminate violence. The ECJ reasoned that both 
of these phrases imply general situations where many people, independent 
of their particular circumstances, are threatened.
261
  
In analyzing article 15(c)‘s reference to individual threat, the ECJ 
stressed that article 15(c) links ―individual threat‖ to ―indiscriminate 
violence‖ resulting from armed conflict.262 The court reasoned that in this 
context—situations characterized by high levels of indiscriminate violence 
 
 
 254. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶ 36. 
 255. Id. ¶ 38. 
 256. Id. ¶ 28.  
 257. Qualification Directive, supra note 113, art. 15(c). 
 258. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶ 32.  
 259. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34. 
 260. Id. ¶ 33. 
 261. Id. ¶ 34.  
 262. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35, 38. 
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due to international or internal armed conflict—all individual civilians will 
be at risk. As a result, in these circumstances the term ―individual threat‖ 
would encompass the grave risk that an individual would face solely on 
account of his or her presence.
263
 In the court‘s view, the danger from such 
indiscriminate violence would be arbitrary and haphazard rather than 
linked to an individual‘s politics, race, religion, or other attributes.264 
Therefore, it would be illogical to require applicants for subsidiary 
protection under article 15(c) to show they had been individually targeted.  
The court acknowledged that the warning contained in the 
Qualification Directive‘s preamble could be seen to undermine the text‘s 
reference to violence of a wholesale nature. The preambular clause 
cautions: ―Risks to which a population of a country or a section of the 
population is generally exposed do normally not create in themselves an 
individual threat which would qualify as serious harm.‖265 
The ECJ, though, discounted this limiting clause by highlighting the 
word ―normally.‖ The court reasoned that if general risks do not normally 
constitute individual threats, this acknowledges that they can do so in 
exceptional situations.
266
 Thus, the ECJ imparted a broad interpretation of 
article 15(c); at least in exceptional circumstances subsidiary protection 
applicants can satisfy the individual threat requirement by producing 
evidence of a high level of general risk from indiscriminate violence. In 
these circumstances, the only thing individual about the threat is that the 
claimant for subsidiary protection will face the threat, as will all of his or 
her neighbors. To put it another way, any individual in these 
circumstances can show that he or she faces a real risk of suffering serious 
harm.  
Having prescribed the outer limits of article 15(c), the ECJ began to 
circumscribe its general applicability. The court said that in normal 
circumstances, applicants for subsidiary protection pursuant to article 
15(c) must show more than a mere risk they will be threatened by armed 
conflict in their home region. In most situations, the court suggested, 
threats directed at the subsidiary protection applicant would be relevant to 
determining whether or not the applicant faces a risk of serious harm.
267
 
Elaborating on this point, the ECJ set forth a sliding scale for evaluating 
 
 
 263. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶ 35. 
 264. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35. 
 265. Qualification Directive, pmbl., ¶ 26. 
 266. Elgafaji, 2009 E.C.R. I-00921, ¶ 37. 
 267. The ECJ bolstered this reasoning by noting that the existence of threats directed at the 
applicant is relevant under Articles 15(a) and 15(b). Id. ¶ 38. 
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claims relying on article 15(c): ―[T]he more the applicant is able to show 
that he is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his 
personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence 
required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection.‖268  
Further, the court emphasized that it is up to the national authorities to 
assess the evidence to determine the level of indiscriminate violence.
269
 
With these two pronouncements, the court significantly limited the 
availability of subsidiary protection. Deference to the Member State‘s 
evaluation of the level of violence in the applicant‘s home region, coupled 
with a flexible inverse correlation between the extent of indiscriminate 
violence and the need to produce evidence of individually targeted threats, 
will enable Member States to restrict the award of subsidiary protection.  
In sum, the ECJ ruled that those who seek subsidiary protection due to 
danger from armed conflict should generally support their claims with 
evidence that their personal circumstances put them at special risk. 
Nonetheless, if the level of indiscriminate violence is sufficiently high, 
subsidiary protection is available without any showing that the applicant 
has been targeted. The ECJ therefore informed the Dutch Council of State 
that article 15(c) does not require that subsidiary protection applicants 
produce evidence that they are specifically targeted due to their personal 
attributes or circumstances.
270
  
Although the Elgafaji judgment adopted an open-ended interpretation 
of the ―serious harm‖ requirement, the court accorded government 
authorities substantial power to apply this broad reading in a restrictive 
fashion. In practice, government officials will be able to ration the grant of 
subsidiary protection to war refugees.
271
 Nonetheless, the CEAS has taken 
a major step forward in refugee protection. By requiring Member States to 
grant asylum, in the form of subsidiary protection, based on serious threats 
of indiscriminate war-time violence, the Qualification Directive has begun 
to close the protection gap that has until now existed beyond the contours 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
272
  
 
 
 268. Id. ¶ 39. 
 269. Id. ¶ 35. 
 270. Id. ¶ 43. 
 271. Indeed, after the ECJ issued the Elgafaji judgment, the Dutch Council of State reviewed the 
evidence concerning the security situation in Baghdad and concluded that the level of indiscriminate 
violence was not sufficiently high to support the conclusion that Mr. and Mrs. Elgafaji were, by their 
mere presence, at risk of serious individual threats to their lives or physical safety. Conseil d‘État [CE] 
[Council of State] May 25, 2009, Vreemdelingen, No. 200702174/2/V2, http://www.conseildetat.be 
(Belg.), available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl (search for ―BI4791‖). 
 272. In the wake of the ECJ‘s 2009 Elgafaji opinion, courts in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have wrestled with article 15(c) of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] EU ASYLUM POLICY 131 
 
 
 
 
Of paramount importance, EU law makes subsidiary protection an 
enforceable right. The burden on individual applicants for subsidiary 
protection may be high and the courts may exhibit substantial deference to 
national authorities, but protection for refugees fleeing armed warfare is 
no longer solely a matter of executive discretion.
273
 Iraqis and others 
forced from their homes by indiscriminate violence have the right, once 
they reach the EU, to go to court to demand legal protection. Relatively 
few may gain access to Europe to claim protection from armed conflict 
that has engulfed their homelands. The initial applicants may find success 
infrequently. But a new norm, responsive to the real world experience of 
people forced by war to flee their homelands, is developing. Rather than 
compelling asylum applicants to mold their claims to fit a persecution 
model, the EU has created a new protection paradigm that is aligned to the 
reality of refugees in the twenty-first century.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The past two decades have witnessed the growth of a regional approach 
to asylum policy in the EU, a substantial advance for a polity that in 1987 
rejected European Commission requests for information on migration as 
infringements of the national sovereignty of the Member States. Within 
twenty years the EU agreed to develop a common asylum law and put into 
place the first elements of the CEAS. Though this common policy is a 
product of many political compromises that limit the reach and content of 
protection available to asylum seekers, it has significantly expanded the 
substantive protection guaranteed to people forced from their homes by 
war.  
Furthermore, the ECJ judgment of February 17, 2009 interpreted the 
new subsidiary protection mandate broadly to include those who face high 
levels of indiscriminate violence in their country of origin but have not 
been individually targeted themselves. At the same time, the court 
 
 
Qualification Directive. Roger Errera, The CJEU and Subsidiary Protection: Reflections on Elgafaji–
and After, 23 INT‘L J. REFUGEE L. 93 (2011). The differing interpretations adopted by French and 
English courts to subsidiary protection under article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive indicate that 
substantial protection gaps still exist in EU states. Helene Lambert & Theo Farrell, The Changing 
Character of Armed Conflict and the Implications for Refugee Protection Jurisprudence, 22 INT‘L J. 
REFUGEE L. 237 (2010). 
 273. This is a key difference between subsidiary protection in the EU and Temporary Protected 
Status in the United States. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. Thousands of war refugees 
have received protection in the United States via the TPS program. The decision to grant TPS to 
refugees fleeing a war zone (or other types of non-persecutory harm) rests solely in the unreviewable 
discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security. INA §§ 244(b)(1), 244(b)(5)(A). 
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construed the subsidiary protection provisions to accord substantial 
deference to government authorities‘ assessments of the levels of 
indiscriminate violence relevant to individual cases, and much remains to 
be seen about the contours of subsidiary protection in practice. 
Nonetheless, by establishing an enforceable right to subsidiary protection 
for those fleeing extremely violent armed conflicts, the EU has begun to 
close the yawning protection gap that faces war refugees.  
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